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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Topic 
The topic of this thesis is whether States have subject matter jurisdiction over torture 
committed abroad amongst foreigners. If States have such jurisdiction, it is further of 
interest whether or to what extent they have an obligation to apply this jurisdiction.  
 In the terminology of international criminal law, the jurisdiction examined in the 
thesis is referred to as universal jurisdiction. The place where the crime is committed and 
the nationality of the offender and the victim are irrelevant factors. In other words, the 
crime does not have to be committed within the State’s own territory or by a national of the 
prosecuting State.1
The thesis will examine the existence of universal jurisdiction over torture under 
customary international law and the UN Convention against torture.2
1.2 Background and purpose 
Torture is documented all over the world every day. It is committed in peace time and in 
war time; in ‘democratic’ States as well as in ‘non-democratic’ States. Regular allegations 
of torture come e.g. from the occupied territories in Gaza and the West Bank, from the 
prisons in Brazil and Turkey, and from the US controlled camp at Guantanamo Bay.3  
The perpetrators are State officials or others acting in an official capacity. Even though 
torture mostly is conducted by lower State officials, acts of torture are often tolerated, 
encouraged or directly ordered by the State elite. Heads of State may accordingly be 
complicit in torture, even though they themselves seldom physically engage in the crime.4
The purpose of subjecting individuals to torture is in general to control, punish and 
extract information. The application of torture can be traced back to the beginning of 
                                                 
1 See subsections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 for further nuances. 
2 The UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted in New York 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987. 
3 Documentation of torture is easily attainable on the web sites of Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch; see http://web.amnesty.org/ and http://www.hrw.org/ (visited 06.04.04). 
4 See section 2.4 for the material definition of torture. 
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 civilization and has most commonly been applied to coerce the victim to confess or make 
allegations against other alleged criminals and political opponents.5
Common to the great majority of these acts of torture today is denial on the part of the 
State. If the State does not deny the commission of the acts, their classification as torture is 
contended. When the competent authorities also fail to investigate and prosecute 
allegations of torture, the perpetrators are not held responsible for their actions. The losses 
of the victims are furthermore not redressed. 
If no legal consequences are attributed to perpetrators of criminal acts, the State where 
a crime has been committed fails to enforce a rule of law. Impunity for the most serious 
crimes raises then the question of whether other States can and should initiate criminal 
proceedings, either as individual States or through the United Nations (hereafter UN). By 
prosecuting the responsible individuals through international tribunals or foreign domestic 
courts, a ‘universal’ rule of law could combat the impunity which often prevails on the 
domestic level. 
The question of whether the UN or individual States have a right or duty to prosecute 
torture is nonetheless complex, both legally and politically. The complexity is based on a 
potential conflict with the fundamental principle of State sovereignty. The interpretation 
and application of State sovereignty is accordingly crucial for the discussion on whether, or 
to what extent, State A can or should prosecute crimes of torture committed in State B 
when State B is unable or unwilling to prosecute the crime itself. 
Under the main principle on State jurisdiction, the territorial sovereignty of State B 
provides territorial jurisdiction over persons present within the State’s territory and acts 
committed within the State’s territory. If a crime has been committed within the territory 
by a national of State C, this State can be recognized to have an equal interest in the 
prosecution on the basis of this State’s personal jurisdiction over its own nationals. If the 
crime has been committed in the territory of State B by a national of State B, as mostly is 
the case with torture, State B has both territorial and personal jurisdiction. If State B argues 
that the prosecution of torture is a matter within the State’s exclusive domestic jurisdiction, 
other States claiming jurisdiction must provide evidence that the prosecution of torture not 
is an internal affair and that their prosecution is lawful under international law.  
Despite the controversial nature of prosecution which cannot be based on the 
traditional principles of territorial and personal jurisdiction, international law has evolved 
                                                 
5 For an elaboration of the history of torture, see e.g. Peters, Torture (1996). 
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 significantly post World War Two in order to create universal mechanisms for enforcement 
of individual criminal liability. Of greatest importance is the establishment of international 
criminal tribunals with jurisdiction over individuals accused of the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Of current importance are the International 
Criminal Court (hereafter ICC),6 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (hereafter ICTY)7 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(hereafter ICTR).8  
The mere existence of these tribunals, and the recognition of their practice, is evidence 
that the international community regards itself endowed with the legal capacity to create 
international bodies with competence to adjudicate violations of humanitarian law 
committed in States. Acts of torture committed in peace time can be covered by the 
jurisdiction of the international tribunals, but only if they have a nexus to a widespread and 
systematic attack on a population.9 In these situations, acts of torture constitute crimes 
against humanity and not torture as an individual crime.  
Current international tribunals do not have competence to try torture as an individual 
crime, i.e. single acts of torture committed in peace time. The individual crime of torture 
was included in the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court,10 but the crime was not included in the final Statute. Criminal tribunals 
with a mixture of national and international elements have been established in Sierra 
Leone11 and East Timor,12 but only the Court in East Timor is provided with jurisdiction 
over the individual crime of torture.13 Thus, if these crimes of torture are to be prosecuted, 
other individual States have to prosecute them in their own domestic courts. 
Certain States have extended their jurisdiction to cover torture committed abroad by 
foreigners when their own nationals are victims. This form of jurisdiction is based on the 
                                                 
6 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome 17 July 1998, entered into force 
1 July 2002. 
7 See the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 1993, last 
amended 17 May 2002. 
8 See the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted 8 November 1994, last amended 
14 August 2002. 
9 See article 7 of the ICC Statute, article 3 of the ICTR Statute and article 5 of the ICTY Statute. 
10 See Report of the International Law Commission, The International Law Commission’s Draft Statute for 
an International Criminal Court (1994), pp. 141 ff. 
11 See the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, established 16 January 2002. 
12 See United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, On the Establishment of Panels with 
Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, adopted 6 June 2000. 
13 Ibid., article 7. A mixed tribunal is further to be established in Cambodia, but individual crimes of torture 
are not included in the proposed jurisdiction of the tribunal, see the Draft agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Cambodia on the Khmer Rouge trials, adopted 13 May 2003. 
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 so-called passive personality principle. Other States have in stead or in addition extended 
their jurisdiction to cover torture committed abroad without requiring any personal link to 
the crime. This jurisdiction is based on the universality principle and referred to as 
universal jurisdiction. The two basis of jurisdiction may be applied in conjunction, as done 
by Israel in the case against Eichman,14 but universal jurisdiction may also form the sole 
basis for jurisdiction. While States earlier have been unwilling to exercise jurisdiction only 
on the basis of the universality principle, recent State practice provide evidence that States 
now are prepared to do so in the case of torture. 
In connection with the landmark case against the Chilean ex-dictator Pinochet in 1998 
and 1999,15 Spain, France, Switzerland and Belgium all raised extradition claims towards 
the UK for the purpose of criminal prosecution of Pinochet.16 The claims for extradition 
were based on universal jurisdiction.17 After the Pinochet case, a case was filed in Belgium 
courts against the Chadian ex-dictator Hissène Habré for alleged crimes of torture 
committed in Chad in the period from 1982 until 1990.18 Furthermore, as late as 7 April 
2004, a Dutch court convicted the former Congolese military officer Sebastian Nzapali of 
torture committed in the Congo in 1995 and 1996.19
A case of importance has also erupted between France and the Congo, registered by 
the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) as the Case Concerning Certain Criminal 
proceedings in France.20 The factual background is that France in 2002 initiated 
investigations regarding the responsibility of high ranking Congolese State officials for 
crimes of torture committed in the Congo against individuals of Congolese nationality. A 
warrant for immediate appearance has been issued in the case of General Norbert Dabira, 
who is Inspector-General of the Congolese Armed Forces. This warrant can be enforced if 
Dabira appears in France, where he has a residence. The Congo has strongly opposed the 
measures of investigation and prosecution taken by France, and has brought the case to the 
                                                 
14 The fact of the case is presented in subsection 4.2.3.2. 
15 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 1999, 
2 All ER 97. 
16 See Brody, “The case of Augusto Pinochet” (2000), p. 18. 
17 In the case of Pinochet, Spanish citizens were among the victims. Spain itself claimed nonetheless 
jurisdiction on the basis of universal jurisdiction as Spain law does not recognize jurisdiction on the basis that 
a Spanish citizen is a victim of an act committed abroad, see Reydams, Universal jurisdiction. International 
and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2003), pp. 183-8. 
18 For up to date information on this case, see http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/ (visited 28.11.2003). 
19 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, “Netherlands: Congolese Torturer Convicted. "King of Beasts" Trial a 
Milestone” (2003). At the time of writing, the judgment is only available in Dutch and comments in English 
are only available in non-academic articles. 
20 See General List of ICJ, No. 129. 
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 ICJ. The ICJ has so far rejected a request for the indication of a provisional measure and 
fixed the time limits for the filing of written pleadings.21
Since Pinochet, Habré, Nzapali and Dabira all have been accused of bearing 
responsibility for torture committed in their own countries, mainly against their own 
citizens, these cases illustrate that certain States not only are willing, but also regard 
themselves authorized to prosecute torture committed abroad amongst foreigners. The 
objections raised by e.g. the Congo in the Case Concerning Certain Criminal proceedings 
in France illustrates at the same time that not all States welcome this form of international 
enforcement of criminal liability.22
Another State which clearly has expressed its discontent with universal prosecution is 
the USA. The dissatisfaction with the Belgium law on universal jurisdiction made the USA 
threatened to move the NATO Headquarters out of Brussels unless the Belgium 1993 Act 
Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian law was 
repealed.23 Although the law did not establish universal jurisdiction over torture as an 
individual crime, the response from the USA illustrates that universal jurisdiction is a form 
of criminal jurisdiction which is highly controversial. The objections from the USA were 
put forward after lawsuits were filed in Belgium courts against foreign high profiled 
politicians. The most serious claims were raised against the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon, but complaints were also filed against General Tommy Franks, the commander of 
US troops in Iraq,24 the US President George W. Bush and the UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair.25 The Belgian law on universal jurisdiction was last repealed in August 2003, but the 
new law did not affect a limited number of cases that had already begun to move forward. 
The case against Hissène Habré is among these.26
The widespread political disagreement in the international community regarding 
universal jurisdiction creates certain urgency for clarifying the legal premises for this kind 
of criminal jurisdiction. The question of universal jurisdiction must thereafter be assessed 
individually in regard to each category of crimes. This thesis examines only the question of 
                                                 
21 The order on the request for the indication of a provisional measure was given 17 June 2003; a summary of 
the order is available at http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/icof/icofsummaries/icofsummary 
20030617.html (visited 08.04.04). The order of the court regarding time-limits for the filing of written 
pleadings was given 11 July 2003. The time limits are 11 December 2003 for the memorial and 11 May 2004 
for the counter memorial. 
22 The arguments raised by the Congo are presented in the summary referred to in note 19. 
23 See BBC News, “US attacks Belgium war crimes law” (2003). 
24 See BBC News, “US general ‘war crimes’ case filed” (2003). 
25 See BBC News, “Belgium amends war crimes law” (2003). 
26 See Human Rigths Watch, “Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed” (2003). 
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 universal jurisdiction over individual crimes of torture, but as long as the practice and the 
impunity persist for these crimes, this will remain a contentious and important issue in 
international law. The political aspect of the topic should not be undermined, but the focus 
of this thesis is the legal questions of relevance. 
 The scope of the thesis will now be further delimitated in section 1.3. Section 1.4 
elaborates thereafter on the main terminology of the study, while section 1.5 presents 
methodological issues of special importance. An outline of the rest of the thesis is provided 
in section 1.6. 
1.3 Delimitations 
1.3.1 No examination of immunity or other impediments for prosecution 
Even though a State has subject matter jurisdiction under international law, prosecution in 
a given case may be barred by other rules of international or domestic law. Of greatest 
practical importance in the case of torture is the validity of international immunity claims; 
in particular claims related to functional immunity of sitting and former State officials. An 
analysis of this issue requires a separate and thorough examination, which unfortunately 
can not be included in the present thesis without violating its fixed limitations in regard to 
length.27
 Other grounds which may be invoked as impediments for prosecution are the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, statutes of delimitation, the prohibition against double 
jeopardy, and domestic amnesties. Their relevance will in most cases depend on the status, 
application and recognition of the domestic law of the State where torture has been 
committed. Due to the fixed limitations of the study, these issues will not be addressed in 
the thesis, except from the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, which is of relevance also 
for the categorization of torture as an international crime.28
                                                 
27 Additional literature on the relevance of immunity should therefore be consulted, see e.g. Cassese, 
International Criminal Law (2003), pp. 264-73 and 321-2, Ruud, The Pinochet case and customary 
international law: Immunity for former heads of State (2002), and Broomhall, International Justice & the 
International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003), pp. 128-50. 
28 The principle of nullum crimen sine lege is explored in section 2.7. For additional literature in regard to 
statutes of delimitation, the prohibition against double jeopardy, and domestic amnesties, see e.g. Cassese 
(2003), pp. 312-21. For a somewhat alternative and more nuanced analysis of the relevance of domestic 
amnesties, see Boed, “The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute 
Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations” (2000), pp. 297-329. 
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  The focus of the thesis is accordingly the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over 
torture when committed abroad amongst foreigners. Conditions which may block 
prosecution in a given case are not analysed. 
1.3.2 Torture separate from other categories of international crimes 
The term ‘torture’ refers as a rule to single acts of torture, independent on whether they are 
committed in peace time or war time. As mentioned in section 1.2, acts of torture may also 
be prohibited by international humanitarian law as war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and as elements of the crime of genocide if the acts meet additional requirements. 
 When the study is limited to an examination of universal jurisdiction over torture as 
an individual crime, the chief explanation is that torture as part of humanitarian law is 
covered by the jurisdictions of the ICC,29 the ICTY,30 and the ICTR.31 Were universal 
jurisdiction over these crimes to be discussed, the rules governing the jurisdiction of 
international tribunals would have to be explored in addition to the rules governing 
domestic courts. The numerous differences between these sets of rules would unduly 
widen the scope of the analysis and make it difficult to elaborate in depth on the central 
questions. Universal jurisdiction over acts of torture constituting war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and elements of the crime of genocide will accordingly not be addressed 
in the study. 
1.3.3 Enforcement of individual liability, not State responsibility 
The legal conceptualization of the crime of torture follows a model of dual responsibility. 
Both the individual offender and the State per se are viewed as responsible. While the 
individual bears responsibility through his or her violation of criminal law, the State is 
responsible through the violation of the international human right to be free from torture.32
 The two models of responsibility are enforced through different procedural 
regimes. While individuals can be tried in foreign domestic courts, States per se are in 
principle immune from the jurisdiction of other States.33 The discussion on whether States 
have universal jurisdiction over torture is therefore relevant for the enforcement of 
                                                 
29 See the Rome Statute of the ICC articles 5-8. 
30 See the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia articles 2, 4 and 5. 
31 See the Statute of the ICTR articles 2-4. 
32 The relevant human rights provisions are briefly presented in section 2.2. 
33 The immunity of States in regard to torture is discussed by the European Court of Human Rights in Al 
Adsani v. U.K., App. No. 35763/97, §§ 60-61 (hereafter the Al Adsani case). The case is briefly presented in 
section 2.5. 
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 individual liability, not State responsibility. Whether domestic courts have jurisdiction to 
enforce State responsibility for torture will thus not be subjected to discussion.34
1.3.4 Enforcement of criminal, not civil individual liability 
As torture traditionally has been thought of as a crime rather than a civil tort, this thesis 
focuses on jurisdictional questions regarding the enforcement of criminal individual 
liability, not civil. It should be noted, however, that US courts since the 1980s have proved 
that civil litigation might serve as an expedient alternative to criminal prosecution. By 
applying the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act on acts of torture, for the first time in the 
landmark case Filartiga v. Peña-Irala,35 US courts were given subject matter jurisdiction in 
cases they did not have criminal jurisdiction to try. The establishment of torture as an 
international tort and the enforcement civil individual liability through tort litigation is a 
promising case of legal innovation. At present, though, there are few signs that other 
countries are adopting this legal model.36  
1.4 Terminology 
1.4.1 Jurisdiction 
The term jurisdiction has been attributed various meanings in international and domestic 
law. It refers in essence to the distribution of authority, as distinguished from the exercise 
of power, among different legal institutions and separate political entities.37  
An important distinction is drawn between legislative, judicial and enforcement 
jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction gives the State authority to make binding laws. 
Judicial jurisdiction concerns the competence of the State’s courts to try a case. 
Enforcement jurisdiction regards the right of the State to ensure compliance with the law 
through executive acts. These three forms of jurisdiction refer to the three branches of 
State authority and have their legal basis in the sovereignty of the State. To ‘exercise’ 
jurisdiction means in the terminology of the International Court of Justice to apply either 
judicial or enforcement jurisdiction.38
                                                 
34 For a critical discussion on the relationship between State immunity and human rights violations, see 
Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (1997). 
35 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980) (hereafter the Filartiga case). 
36 For a thorough analysis and discussion of the topic, see Scott (ed.), Torture as Tort. Comparative 
Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (2001). 
37 See Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964), p. 21. 
38 See Judgment No. 9, The Case of the Steamship "Lotus", P.C.I.J. Series A No. 10, 1927, p. 5 of the part 
referred to as “The Law” in the version enclosed in the Annex. 
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  Another important distinction in regard to State jurisdiction under international law 
is the distinction between jurisdiction over acts committed within and outside the territory 
of the legislative State. The term territorial jurisdiction applies to acts that are committed 
within the territory of the State. In these cases, the jurisdiction to legislate, adjudicate and 
enforce is limited to the territory of the State.  
 The term extraterritorial jurisdiction applies to acts committed outside the territory 
of the State. In these cases, only the jurisdiction to legislate extends beyond the boarders of 
the legislative State. Judicial and enforcement jurisdiction is exercised within the territory 
of the legislative State.39  
 When there is a need to specifically address the establishment of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in domestic law, as distinct from the later exercise of this jurisdiction, the term 
extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction will be applied. 
1.4.2 Conditioned universal jurisdiction 
The term conditioned universal jurisdiction resembles a narrow conception of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction.40 This form of jurisdiction covers crimes that have taken place 
outside the territory of the legislating State, by foreigners with effect on foreigners, when 
the alleged offender is present within the territory of the legislating State by his or her own 
free will. This jurisdiction gives no right to initiate criminal investigations, issue 
international arrest warrants or extradition claims in cases where an alleged perpetrator is 
present in the territory of another State. 
 Alternative terms for this jurisdiction are e.g. ‘quasi-universal jurisdiction’,41 
jurisdiction based on the ‘co-operative limited universality principle’42 and ‘jurisdiction to 
establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events’.43 Since the 
presence of the alleged perpetrator is a necessary condition for the existence of jurisdiction, 
the term ‘conditioned universal jurisdiction’ is preferred in this thesis. 
                                                 
39 See e.g. Reydams (2003), p. 5. 
40 See Cassese (2003), p. 285-6.  
41 See Shaw, International Law (2003), p. 597-8. 
42 See Reydams (2003), pp. 35-8. 
43 See § 42 of the Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal to the Judgement of 
the International Court of Justice in the Case of the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Belgium), 14 February 2002, General List No. 121 (hereafter the Arrest Warrant case). 
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 1.4.3 Absolute universal jurisdiction 
The term absolute universal jurisdiction encompasses a broad notion of the universality 
principle.44 This term refers to jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the territory of 
the legislating State, by foreigners with effect on foreigners, independent of whether the 
alleged offender is present in the territory of the legislating State. This jurisdiction includes 
the right to initiate criminal investigations, issue international arrest warrants and 
extradition claims in cases where an alleged perpetrator is present in the territory of 
another State. The jurisdiction does not include the right to exercise jurisdiction outside the 
legislative State’s territory by abduct an alleged perpetrator present in another State. 
 It is a general requirement of fair trial that a defendant has the right to be present 
during criminal proceedings.45 Exceptions to this rule should have justified reasons,46 as 
the presence is necessary for an effective exercise of the right to defend oneself. In order 
not to violate this rule, an alleged offender can in principle only be subjected to 
prosecution, on the basis of absolute universal jurisdiction, if the person is extradited from 
the State where he or she is present. 
 Alternative terms for this jurisdiction are e.g. ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’,47 
jurisdiction based on ‘the unilateral limited universality principle’48 and ‘universal 
jurisdiction properly so called’49 or ‘universal jurisdiction strictu sensu’.50 Since this form 
of subject matter jurisdiction requires no nexus what so ever between the State claiming 
jurisdiction and the crime, the term ‘absolute universal jurisdiction’ is preferred in this 
thesis.  
1.4.4 Distinction between the territorial, national and custodial State 
When crimes are covered by universal jurisdiction, several States have competing 
jurisdiction over the same act. It is accordingly useful to apply a terminology which clearly 
signifies the status of a State in regard to the crime.  
 The term territorial State refers in the following to the State in whose territory a 
crime has been committed. The term national State refers to the State of nationality of an 
                                                 
44 See Cassese (2003), pp. 286-91. 
45 See e.g. article 14 paragraph 3 litra d of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
46 See e.g. the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 13 on ICCPR article 14, § 11, issued 13 
April 1984. 
47 See the Separate opinion of President Guillaume to the Arrest Warrant case, e.g. § 9. 
48 See Reydams (2003), pp. 38-42. 
49 See the Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, e.g. §§ 45 and 51. 
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 alleged perpetrator. The term custodial State refers to the State in whose territory an 
alleged offender is present. It does not imply that the offender is arrested or taken into 
custody by the State, only that the alleged offender can be found within the borders of the 
State.51
1.5 Sources and methodology 
1.5.1 Introduction 
As explained above, the question of study is whether States have subject matter 
jurisdiction, and possibly a duty to exercise this jurisdiction, over torture committed abroad 
amongst foreigners. The study will concentrate on the international rules of relevance, and 
will be based on the sources and methodology of public international law, as applied by the 
International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ).52  
The most authoritative statement of international sources is found in article 38 
paragraph 1 in the Statute of the ICJ.53 The primary sources are international treaties, 
customary law and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The thesis 
will concentrate on an examination of treaty and customary law as primary sources.54 
Methodological issues of importance for their interpretation will be introduced in the 
following. 
1.5.2 The UN Convention against torture 
The convention of chief interest for the topic at hand is the UN Convention against torture 
(hereafter CAT). The Inter-American Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Torture has a similar content,55 but since CAT is universal rather than regional, the present 
study is limited to an examination of CAT. 
                                                                                                                                                    
50 See Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), p. 64. 
51 The terms territorial and custodial State are also used in Reydams (2003), pp. 5-6. 
52 For a general elaboration on the sources and methodology of public international law, see Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (2003), pp. 3-29, Shaw (2003), pp. 65-119 and Malanczuk, Akehurst's 
modern introduction to international law (1997), pp. 35-62. 
53 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, adopted in San Francisco 26 June 1945, entered into force 
24 October 1945. 
54 General principles are mainly consulted as a primary source when treaty and customary law are silent on 
an issue; see Shaw (2003), pp. 92-9 with further references. 
55 Adopted in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 12 September 1985, entered into force 28 February 1985. For 
up to date information on ratifications, see http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Sigs/a-51.html (visited 
16.03.04). 
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  International treaties are interpreted on the basis of the customary rules codified in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter the Vienna Convention).56 
According to the main rule in article 31, treaties should be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the text, in the light of the context and purpose of 
the treaty. 
Supplementary sources are as a main rule according to article 32 only relevant if 
they confirm an interpretation based on the ordinary meaning of the treaty. Only if the 
ordinary meaning provides an ambiguous or unreasonable result can supplementary 
sources be invoked in support of an alternative interpretation. Supplementary sources of 
main relevance are the preparatory work of the treaty, judicial decisions, and legal theory.57  
State practice is primarily important for the assessment of customary law, but it 
may also be a source of relevance when interpreting treaty law.58 State practice will 
accordingly be referred to when it provides interesting illustrations and examples of how 
State Parties have chosen to fulfil their treaty obligations. References to State practice will 
mainly be based on second hand sources. 
1.5.3 Customary international law 
While treaties only bind State Parties, customary law is in principle equally binding on all 
States. Customary law determines accordingly whether Non-Party States to CAT and the 
Inter-American Convention have a right or a duty to apply universal jurisdiction over 
torture, and, of relevance for this thesis, whether State Parties to CAT have a wider right 
and duty than under CAT. 
A further consequence of customary law is that it may limit the interpretation and 
application of treaty provisions. If a prima facie interpretation of CAT leads to a result that 
infringes upon the sovereign rights of Non-Party States, the interpretation has to be 
modified so as to not interfere with the rights of Non-Party States under customary law.59
 Customary law is composed by consistent State practice and opinio juris. State 
practice is the objective evidence that the States regard themselves bound by an obligation. 
Opinio juris refers to the States’ subjective perception of a legal obligation.60 Since the 
                                                 
56 Adopted in Vienna 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980. For further references to the 
customary status of the Vienna Convention, see Shaw (2003), p. 839. 
57 See article 38 paragraph 1 litra d of the ICJ Statute. 
58 Subsequent practice which establishes an agreement among the parties shall be taken into account together 
with the context of the treaty according to article 31. In regard to the topic at hand, no such agreement exists. 
59 See article 34 of the Vienna Convention. 
60 See e.g. Shaw (2003), pp. 68-72, Brownlie (2003), pp. 6-10, and Higgins (1994), p. 18. 
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 availability of State practice and opinio juris often is scarce and not representative of all 
States, subsidiary sources of interpretation is important for the determination of customary 
law.  
International tribunals are in practice regarded as the most authoritative interpreters 
of customary law.61 International judgments constitute therefore the point of departure for 
the legal analysis of customary law. Judgments of special relevance are the judgment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (hereafter PCIJ) in the Lotus case from 1927 and 
the judgment of the ICTY in the Furundzjia case from 1998.62 The Lotus judgment is 
important as it provides the only authoritative discussion on extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction in current international jurisprudence.63 The Furundzjia case is significant as 
the judgment explicitly discusses the international recognition of torture under customary 
law and the consequences attached to this recognition.  
Common for both judgments is that the statements of relevance are given as obiter 
dicta and not as part of the ratio decidendi. This means that they are not necessary for the 
result of the cases. According to the traditional doctrine of precedent, an obiter dictum is 
not part of the decision which is binding for future cases and has less weight than a ratio 
decidendi. Since many domestic systems have adopted the doctrine of precedent, it is 
worth noticing that the doctrine is not formally recognized in international law,64 even 
though international judgment are important for the interpretation and application of 
international law. The fact that the interpretations of customary law are given as obiter 
dicta should therefore not be decisive for their weight and authority. Of importance is 
rather the fact that they are delivered by an international tribunal. Whether they should be 
accepted as correct assessments of customary law should be assessed on the basis of the 
background, circumstances and subsequent developments of the interpretations.65
Separate and dissenting opinions to the Arrest Warrant case, adjudicated by the ICJ 
in 2002, are also of interest for the topic. While the judgement itself is silent on the issue of 
universal jurisdiction, individual judges elaborate on the topic in individual opinions. The 
opinions are relevant as subsidiary sources, but the question is how their weight is to be 
evaluated. Even though these opinions represent the view of individual judges and not the 
                                                 
61 The importance of judicial decisions is e.g. addressed in Shaw (2003), p. 103 and Brownlie (2003), pp. 19-
23. 
62 The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. 17-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment 10 December 1998. 
63 The ICJ has not yet discussed the subject matter of the Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in 
France, see note 21 with accompanying text. 
64 See article 59 of the ICJ Statute.  
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 ICJ, their weight is arguably on a level above regular legal theory. Greater weight should 
be attributed to these opinions due to the experience of their authors as judges of the 
International Court of Justice and their influence on future decisions by the ICJ. 
Domestic judicial decisions form another subsidiary source of importance. It is 
nonetheless difficult to determine to what extent a single decision from a domestic court 
should influence the interpretation of customary international law. A domestic decision 
may represent both State practice and opinio juris of a State, but it can also be questioned 
whether one single judgment should be assessed as authoritative evidence of State practice 
and opinio juris. The weight of an interpretation expressed in a domestic judgment should 
depend on the extent to which the interpretation is supported by international tribunals, 
other domestic decisions and publicists of international law. 
Another subsidiary source of interpretation is legal theory. Interpretations by 
publicists are never regarded as authoritative, but they may influence the development of 
customary law. As in the case of domestic judicial decisions, their significance increases 
when supported by other publicists or other sources of international law. The study refers 
mainly to legal theory published in English. Texts originally published in other languages 
are only referred to when they have been translated into English.66
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States is in the study 
referred to as legal theory.67 The Restatement is frequently referred to as an authoritative 
source of international law, especially by publicists from common law countries, but the 
publication is not an official document or an authoritative statement issued by the USA. It 
is an academic publication sponsored by the Government of the USA, with the purpose to 
describe that State’s application of international law in regard to its foreign relations. It is 
authoritative in the sense that it represents the prevailing interpretation of international law 
in the USA. 
1.5.4 The hierarchical structure of international law 
Current international law recognizes certain international rules as more significant than 
others. These norms form a hierarchy of international law, organized through the concepts 
of jus cogens norms, erga omnes obligations and international crimes.68 The scope and 
                                                                                                                                                    
65 See Ragazzi, The Concept of international obligations erga omnes (2000), p. 6. 
66 This is relevant mainly for chapter 3. The main reference is the writer responsible for the translation. 
67 The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third), The Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (1987) (hereafter the Restatement). 
68 The concepts are elaborated on in sections 2.5-2.7. 
 14 
 practical consequences of these categories have long been debated, and it has been 
questioned whether universal jurisdiction applies to crimes violating the relevant norms. 
To be studied is whether torture pertains to any or all of these categories, and whether this 
classification provides States with subject matter jurisdiction over torture committed 
abroad amongst foreigners. 
1.6 Outline 
After the above presentation of the topic and scope, chapter two moves on to examine the 
international recognition of the prohibition against torture. The chapter includes an 
elaboration of its status as a rule of customary law, a jus cogens norm, an obligation erga 
omnes and an international crime. This recognition is linked to the hierarchical structure of 
international law and is important for the further discussion on universal jurisdiction. 
 Chapter three presents an historical outline of the conceptual development of 
universal jurisdiction. The presentation focuses on the variations in scope and rationale 
reflected in doctrine. The different theories on universal jurisdiction have influenced the 
development of international law and the chapter seeks to prepare the reader for the legal 
analysis following in chapter four and five. 
 Since customary law has relevance for the interpretation of CAT, customary law is 
examined in chapter four. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section 
discusses the legal premises for criminal extraterritorial jurisdiction and applies it to 
universal jurisdiction. The second section examines whether, and to what extent, 
international customary rules recognizes universal jurisdiction over torture. 
 Chapter five examines the application of conditioned universal jurisdiction over 
torture under CAT. This chapter is also divided in two sections, where the first elaborates 
on the right and duty to establish and the second on the right and duty to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over torture. 
 The sixth and last chapter provides concluding remarks with respect to the main 
questions discussed in the thesis. The chapter ends with a de lege ferenda evaluation of the 
topic, focusing on the political benefits and dangers of universal jurisdiction over torture. 
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2 The prohibition against torture in international law 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the outline, the nature of the international prohibition against torture is 
relevant for the discussion on whether States have competence to prosecute torture 
committed abroad amongst foreigners. To be explored in this chapter, after having 
presented international documents recognizing the prohibition against torture, is the 
prohibition’s status under customary international law. Since torture is extensively abused 
it is important first to examine whether the prohibition against torture in itself is accepted 
as a rule of customary law, before its status as a jus cogens norm, an erga omnes obligation 
and an international crime is examined. The possible legal consequences of its status under 
international law will be examined further in chapter 4. 
2.2 Recognition in international documents 
The prohibition against torture has attained a widespread recognition in international law. 
The basic norm was first formulated in article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights:69  
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment”. 
The prohibition against torture has later been adopted in a number of international legal 
instruments as a human right from which no derogation can be made: articles 7 and 4 
paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter 
ICCPR),70 articles 3 and 15 paragraph 2 of the European Convention for the protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ECHR),71 article 5 paragraph 2 of the 
                                                 
69 Adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly 10 December 1948. 
70 See note 41. 
71 Adopted in Rome 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, revised through the adoption of 
Protocol 11, which entered into force 1 November 1998. 
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 American Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ACHR)72 and article 5 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.73  
 The prohibition against torture was further elaborated in the UN Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,74 followed up by the UN Convention against Torture 
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Two regional 
conventions addressing the prevention of torture have also been adopted; the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture75 and the European Convention for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereafter 
ECPT).76  
 As mentioned above in section 1.4.2, CAT and the Inter-American Convention 
address the responsibility of States to criminalize torture and investigate and prosecute 
alleged offenders. In addition, CAT creates a special committee; the Torture Committee. 
This body has authority to examine regular State reports in order to make 
recommendations for improvements.77 The ECPT also provides for the establishment of a 
committee, but the committee has a different type of mandate. Its function is to conduct 
visits to State Parties in order to examine the fulfilment of their obligation to refrain from 
torture.78  
 The prohibition against torture has finally been incorporated in several soft law 
documents on the treatment of prisoners.79
                                                 
72 Adopted in San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978. 
73 Adopted in Banjul, the Gambia, 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986. 
74 Adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly 9 December 1975. 
75 See note 46. 
76 Adopted 26 November 1987, amended according to the provisions of Protocols No. 1 and No. 2, the latest 
entered into force on 1 March 2002. 
77 See CAT articles 17, 19 and 20. In the case of the Inter-American Convention, according to article 17, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is given the competence to analyze the endeavours of the 
State Parties to prevent and eliminate torture in its annual report.  
78 See ECPT article 2. An optional protocol to CAT, adopted 18 December 2002, creates a similar 
competence for an international inspection committee, but it has not yet entered into force. 
79 See the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted 30 August 1955, and approved 
by the Economic and Social Council 31 July 1957 and 13 May 1977; Basic Principles for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly 14 December 1990; Principles of Medical 
Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and 
Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the 
General Assembly 18 December 1982; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the General Assembly 9 December 1988; and The Robben Island 
Guidelines to Prohibit Torture in Africa, adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
in Banjul, the Gambia, in October 2002.  
 17 
 2.3 Recognition as customary law  
As mentioned in section 1.4.3, customary law is normally identified through consistent 
State practice and opinio juris. In the case of torture, consistent State practice is lacking 
due to the widespread de facto application of torture.80 This raises the question of whether 
the prohibition against torture could be accepted as customary law, and whether this in fact 
has happened. 
 Because it is difficult to discern whether a particular practice is the result of social 
usage, practical considerations, morality or lack of morality, evidence of opinio juris is 
important. According to the practice of the ICJ, the perception of a legal obligation may be 
of even greater importance than the actual practice if the practice is concealed or its 
existence denied. This was especially stressed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case: 
“If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained 
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact 
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attribute is to confirm rather 
than to weaken the rule.”81
In the case of torture, States take care to state, in an almost ritual fashion, a principled 
respect for the norm prohibiting torture. This is apparent from the content of the 
international and domestic political discourse, in particular the widespread formal 
recognition of international treaties and the proliferation of policy documents restating the 
prohibitive norm.82 Furthermore, no political regime is known to have objected to the rule 
prohibiting torture or claimed to be unbound by the customary rule.83
 When States are accused of torture by domestic or international actors, they often 
rebut the accusations, present excuses or refer to justifications contained in the rule itself. 
An illustration of this point is provided by the US response to allegations of torture and 
inhuman treatment in the US camp at Guantanamo Bay.84 Another illustration is provided 
by the argumentation of Israel in regard to their use of ‘moderate physical pressure’.85 
Israel did not argue that ‘torture’ was lawful, but by defining torture narrowly, the acts 
were not covered by the Israeli definition.  
                                                 
80 See note 3. 
81 See the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
U.S.A.), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 98, § 185. 
82 See section 2.2. 
83 See Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (1999), pp. 65-7.  
84 See the Guardian, “Detainee tells of Guantanamo ‘torture’” (2004), and “US embassy rebuts Guantánamo 
torture claims” (2004). 
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  On the basis of the rationale that the strong and evident demonstration of opinio 
juris replaces some of the traditional requirements of de facto State practice,86 the ICTY 
and the ECHR have recognized the prohibition against torture as a rule of customary law.87 
The customary status of the prohibition against torture has further been confirmed by 
American and British domestic courts88 and recognized in legal theory.89 These sources of 
international law, in particular when considered jointly, provide substantial support for the 
conclusion that the prohibition against torture is recognized as a norm under customary 
international law.  
2.4 The material definition of torture 
The definition of torture given in CAT article 1 paragraph 1 is considered to incorporate 
the customary elements of the material prohibition against torture.90 According to this 
definition, the term ‘torture’ means: 
“…any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
An act of torture is accordingly identified by three interdependent elements: 1) the act 
inflicts severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 2) it is inflicted with the 
consent or acquiescence of the State authorities and 3) it is inflicted for a specific purpose, 
such as gaining information or confession, punishment or intimidation. The material 
                                                                                                                                                    
85 See e.g. Forrest, “’Moderate Physical Pressure’ in Israel” (2000). 
86 See the Furundzija case, § 138, and the Nicaragua case, pp. 113-4, § 218. 
87 See the ICTY in the Prosecutor v. Delalic and Others, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment 16 
November 1988, §§ 452-454 (hereafter the Delalic case), the Furundzjia case §§ 144-147 and the Prosecutor 
v. Kuranac and Others, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment 22 February 2001, § 466 (hereafter 
the Kuranac case). See the ECHR in Al Adsani case, §§ 60-61. 
88 See the US courts in the Filartiga case, Part II, and in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 
F.2d 699 (9th Circuit 1992) (hereafter the Siderman case), Part II litra A. See the British House of Lords in 
the Pinochet case, pp. 12-3 of the version available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990324/pino1.htm (visited 08.04. 04). 
89 See e.g. the Restatement (1987), Vol. I, p. 161, § 702 (d); Shaw (2003), p. 257; and Higgins (1994), p. 20. 
90 See the ICTY in the Delalic case, §459 and the ECHR in the Al Adsani case, E. § 29. This definition has 
also been referred to as the most authoritative definition of torture in Ratner and Abrams, Accountability for 
Human Rights Atrocities in International Law. Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (2001), p. 117. 
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 definition of torture raises several difficult questions, but for the purpose of the present 
study it is not necessary to address these issues.91
2.5 The prohibition against torture as a jus cogens norm 
International law recognizes the existence of peremptory norms of general international 
law, so called jus cogens norms, from which no derogation is permitted.92 The concept of 
jus cogens is argued to originate both in municipal law and natural law theory, but it was 
first explicitly adopted as a concept of international law in the 1969 Vienna Convention.93 
Jus Cogens was here referred to in article 53, 64, 66 and 71, where article 53 is most 
important in this context. The article is titled “Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm 
of general international law (jus cogens)” and reads: 
“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purpose of the present Convention, 
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only be a 
subsequent norm of general international norm having the same character.” 
Article 53 is directly applicable only in relation to treaties, but it is based on the 
presumption that jus cogens norms already exist. Further, if jus cogens norms only were to 
have relevance in the case of treaty law, States could act contrary to the norms as long as 
customary norms remained un-codified. A logical consequence of the non-derogability of 
peremptory norms is therefore that they also invalidate or make unlawful any unilateral 
state act or customary rule.94  
In the Furundzjia case, the ICTY elaborated on the effects of a jus cogens norm 
under customary international law. The ICTY supported here the conclusion that jus 
cogens norms also applies to customary law: 
“The most conspicuous consequence of this higher rank is that the principle at 
issue cannot be derogated from by States through international treaties or 
                                                 
91 For a thorough discussion of the material content of the prohibition, see Rodley (1999), pp. 75-106. 
92 See e.g. Shaw (2003), pp. 115-9; and Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law. 
Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988), pp. 1-19. 
93 The question of origin was left unaddressed in the Vienna Convention and the definition adopted in the 
Convention has been criticised for its circular argumentation. For further elaboration on its origin, see 
Seiderman, Hierarchy in International law. The Human Right Dimension (2001), pp. 36-40; and Sztuki, Jus 
Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Critical Appraisal (1974), pp. 12-22. 
94 See Shaw (2003), p. 117. 
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 local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with 
the same normative force.”95  
The main question in the case was whether Furundzjia, a local commander, was guilty of 
torture and rape under ‘the Laws or Customs of War’. Even though the crimes adjudicated 
in the case were categorized as war crimes, the ICTY stressed that they at the same time 
violated the customary norm prohibiting torture independent of all other circumstances. 
Due to the States’ recognition of the paramount significance of the prohibition against 
torture, the ICTY concluded that the prohibition against torture had attained the status of a 
jus cogens norm: 
“…the other major feature of the principle proscribing torture relates to the 
hierarchy of rules in the international normative order. Because of the 
importance of the values it protects, this principle has evolved into a 
peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the 
international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’ customary rules.”96
This passage was also cited by the ECHR in the Al Adsani case. This case was raised by a 
dual British-Kuwaiti citizen against the United Kingdom, where the main question was 
whether Al Adsani had the right to institute civil proceedings in the United Kingdom 
against the government of Kuwait for torture and ill-treatment by Kuwaiti officials. The 
Kuwaiti government was found to be immune from the jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom, but the Court agreed with the ICTY that the prohibition against torture is a jus 
cogens norm: 
“…the Court accepts, on the basis of these authorities, that the prohibition 
against torture has achieved the status of a peremptory norm in general 
international law…”97
The UN Human Rights Committee (hereafter Human Rights Committee) has further 
acknowledged the jus cogens status in its General Comment to article 41 of the ICCPR: 
“…some non-derogable rights, which in any event cannot be reserved because 
of their status as peremptory norms, are also of this character - the prohibition 
of torture and arbitrary deprivation of life are examples.”98  
In 1986 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture P. Kooijmans expressed a similar 
view in his report to the Human Rights Committee.99
                                                 
95 See the Furundzjia case, § 153. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See the Al Adsani case § 61. Of relevance is also §§ 30-31 and 60. 
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 Support for this view is also found in judicial decisions from domestic courts. The 
Siderman case from 1992 is of special relevance in this regard. The case was raised by an 
Argentinean Jew who fled torture and confiscation of his wealth in Argentina. On this 
basis he initiated civil proceedings against the Argentinean government in US courts. The 
parties settled in the end, but in the proceedings leading up to the settlement, the 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals gave a thorough examination of the international recognition of the 
prohibition against torture. After the examination, the Court concluded: 
“Given this extraordinarily consensus, we conclude that the right to be free 
from torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest 
status under international law, a norm of jus cogens.”100
The jus cogens status of the prohibition against torture has further been recognized in the 
Restatement101 and by individual publicists such as Lauri Hannikainen,102 M. Cherif 
Bassiouni,103 Kenneth C. Randall,104 Chris Ingelse105 and Ian Seiderman.106  
On the basis of these interpretations of international law it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the prohibition against torture now has been included in the body of 
peremptory norms, from which no derogation is permitted under international law. It is not 
clear though, what the legal implications of the jus cogens status are for the enforcement of 
a norm. This aspect of the prohibition against torture will be examined more in detail when 
analyzing the right and duty of States to exercise universal jurisdiction over torture.107
2.6 The prohibition against torture as an erga omnes obligation 
The concept of erga omnes obligations was first established by the ICJ in their judgment in 
the Barcelona Traction case from 1970.108 The case concerned the question of whether 
Belgium could raise a case against Spain on behalf of Belgian shareholders in a Canadian 
company. The company operated in Spain, which was accused of violating its obligations 
towards the company. When Canada ended their exercise of diplomatic protection, 
                                                                                                                                                    
98 See General comment No. 24, § 10, issued on 4 November 1994. 
99 See Report by the Special Rapporteur on Torture, P. Koojimans, 19 February 1986, p. 1, § 3. 
100 See p. 18 of the version available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/siderman.html (visited 
05.04.04). Reference is here made to further US case law in support of this conclusion. 
101 See the Restatement (1987), p. 167, § 702, Comment n. and Reporter’s note 11. 
102 See Hannikainen (1988), pp. 499-513.  
103 See Bassiouni (2001-2002), p. 108, with further reference in note 92. 
104 See Randall, “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law” (1987-1988), p. 830. 
105 See Ingelse, The UN Committee against Torture: An assessment (2001), p. 325. 
106 See Seiderman (2001), p. 119. 
107 See subsection 4.3.3. 
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 Belgium wanted to exercise diplomatic protection in order to protect the interests of the 
Belgium shareholders. The ICJ rejected the claim as it regarded diplomatic protection only 
to provide a legal interest for the State identified with the injured party, in this case 
Canada. 
Of importance for this thesis is the nuance stressed by the ICJ between obligations 
owed towards one specific State and obligations owed towards the international 
community of States. As opposed to the duty to protect the rights of foreign investments or 
nationals admitted into a State’s territory, the ICJ maintained that an obligation erga omnes 
was an obligation that was owed to the international community as a whole and provided 
every State with a legal interest in its fulfilment.109
The ICJ did not explicitly enlist the prohibition against torture as an erga omnes 
obligation, but neither did the Court give an exhaustive inventory of these obligations. The 
relevant statement on the identification of erga omnes obligations was formulated in a 
rather general manner: 
“Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, 
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination (emphasis 
added).” 110
While it is argued that only a limited number of customary norms have this character, a 
counter argument proposes that in fact most customary international norms have obtained 
this character.111 In this respect it must be emphasized that obligations erga omnes, 
contrary to jus cogens norms, are not distinguished by the importance or non-derogability 
of the right, but rather the identity of the subject to whom the right is addressed. 
 Since the freedom from torture is recognized as one of the most fundamental 
human rights, an interpretation of the phrase “rules governing the basic rights of the 
human person” indicates that the prohibition against torture is included in the category. 
This was also confirmed by the ICTY in the Furundzija-case: 
                                                                                                                                                    
108 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction; Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) 
(Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970. 
109 Ibid, § 33, cited in section 4.3.5. 
110 Ibid., § 34. 
111 Seiderman has adopted the position that human rights in general are obligations erga omnes, see 
Seiderman (2001), p. 9. 
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 “Furthermore, the prohibition against torture imposes upon States obligations 
erga omnes, that is, obligations owed towards all the other members of the 
international community, each of which then has a correlative right” 112
Torture has also been categorized as an erga omnes obligation in the literature by e.g. 
Malcom. N. Shaw,113 Randall114 and Ingelse.115  
 The sources referred to above provide substantial support for the conclusion that 
respect for the prohibition against torture is an erga omnes obligation under international 
law. Of relevance for the present thesis is whether the legal interest conferred by the erga 
omnes character provides a duty for the territorial State to prosecute torturers and possible 
also a right of other States to prosecute extraterritorial crimes of torture. These issues will 
be examined in connection with the customary status of universal jurisdiction over 
torture.116
2.7 Torture as an international crime 
2.7.1 Conditions for defining torture as an international crime 
Individual criminal responsibility under international law was first enforced by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal after World War Two. In the Nuremberg trial, the Court stated: 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.” 117
The crimes investigated and prosecuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal were war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. These crimes are now defined in international treaties as 
international crimes with individual liability.118 Individual crimes of torture committed in 
peace time are not defined as international crimes in any international treaty. They are 
instead prohibited by human rights law, which imposes direct liability upon States only. 
The fact that torture not explicitly is defined as an international crime of its own raises the 
question of whether such acts of torture imposes individual criminal liability under 
international law.  
                                                 
112 See the Furndzija case, § 151.  
113 See Shaw (2003), p. 116. 
114 See Randall (1987-1988), p. 830. 
115 See Ingelse (2001), p. 325. 
116 See subsection 4.3.2 and 4.3.5. 
117 See Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (1947), Vol. I, p. 223. 
118 See notes 29-31. 
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  The main requirements for defining a crime as international have not been 
explicitly formulated by an international court. These criteria can still be identified on the 
basis of domestic judgments and legal theory. The description of an international crime 
given by the US Military Tribunal in the Hostages case after World War Two provides a 
starting point for the examination: 
“An international crime is such act universally recognized as criminal, which 
is considered a grave matter of international concern and for some valid 
reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State that would 
have control over it under ordinary circumstances.”119
This statement emphasizes important requirements for recognizing a crime as international. 
The act has to be universally condemned as a serious crime, the crime has to be of 
international concern, and there has to be a valid ground for other States to prosecute the 
act. 
An additional important requirement is the condition that the crime is explicitly 
defined and criminalized under international law. This requirement is part of the principle 
of legality, and it is based on the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, no crime without 
law.120 According to this principle, no one can be held responsible for a crime which was 
not proscribed by law at the time it was committed.121 Since a person may be held 
criminally responsible on the basis of international law,122 it is a prerequisite that the 
international definition of the crime of torture and its prohibition is sufficiently clear. The 
requirement of criminalization will thus be examined prior to character of the universal 
condemnation and concern for torture. 
A further aspect of the principle of legality is the principle of nullum poena sine lege, 
no punishment without law. Under this principle, widely recognized in domestic criminal 
systems, the penalty for a transgression of the stated norm must be clear and publicly 
known in order for the punitive provision to be lawful. Nevertheless, under international 
law, no fixed penalty is available for international crimes. The principle appears therefore 
to have significance primarily in regard to ‘ordinary’ crimes and will not be discussed.123  
                                                 
119 See the Trial of Wilhelm List and others, United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals. Volume VIII, 1949, Case No. 47, p. 54 (hereafter the ‘Hostages’ case). 
120 The principle of legality and its importance under international law is elaborated on in the ‘Hostages’ case 
at p. 53. 
121 See ICCPR article 15 paragraph 1. 
122 See ICCPR article 15 paragraph 2. 
123 The content of the principle of nullum poena sine lege can be identified in ICCPR article 1, but the 
consequence of this principle is seemingly limited by the wording of paragraph 2: “Nothing in the article 
shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was 
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 2.7.2 Criminalization of torture under international law 
Bruce Broomhall and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill are among those who are skeptical towards 
defining torture as an international crime. In their opinion, torture is ‘only’ a serious crime 
of international concern.124 Their main rationale is that international crimes have to be 
explicitly defined as such in international treaties; since no international instruments define 
torture as an individual international crime, torture has not yet been recognized as one. 
As stressed above, it is correctly observed that under international law with 
universal application, individual crimes of torture are only legally defined in CAT article 1. 
According to CAT, State Parties are obliged to criminalize and prosecute torture on the 
basis of domestic law. However, the fact that torture per se not is defined as an 
international crime in treaty law should not be decisive for the assessment of whether 
torture is an international crime under customary law. It is of interest in this context that 
article 1 of the ICC Statute stipulates that the Court only shall have jurisdiction over “the 
most serious crimes of international concern”. This formulation suggests that there are 
international crimes which are not covered by the jurisdiction of the ICC. Whether torture 
is an international crime, despite the fact that it is not defined as such in the ICC Statute 
should depend on whether torture fulfils the main requirements for international crimes.  
The requirement in regard to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is that the 
criminalization of torture is so clear under international law that a potential violator can 
predict individual criminal liability for single acts of torture committed in peace time. 
The fact that the definition of torture in CAT generally is accepted as customary 
law supports the conclusion that the prohibition against torture does have a clear content 
under customary law.125 As long as the material definition is accepted as international law, 
it could be argued that the nature of CAT as a ‘suppression’ convention, aimed at domestic 
enforcement, is irrelevant for the status of torture as an international crime. 
 Furthermore, as long as torture is unlawful under domestic law in most States, is 
unlawful under international law in peace time when committed with a nexus to a 
widespread and systematic attack on a population126 and is unlawful under international 
                                                                                                                                                    
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations”. 
Paragraph 2 does not stress that the punishment shall be defined under international law, only that the act 
shall be “criminal under international law and”. 
124 See Broomhall (2003), pp. 9-10 and 12-4; and Goodwin-Gill, “Crime in International Law: Obligations 
Erga Omnes and the Duty to Prosecute” (1999), pp. 207-8. 
125 See section 2.4. 
126 See the definition of crimes against humanity, e.g. in the ICC statute article 7. 
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 law in war time, it is difficult to argue that single acts of torture in peace time can be 
calculated to be lawful by a potential perpetrator.127  
The status of torture as an international crime has not been explicitly expressed by an 
international tribunal. The ICTY came nonetheless close to it in the Furundzjia case, when 
elaborating on the relationship between State responsibility and individual responsibility 
for torture:  
“In international human rights law, which deals with State responsibility 
rather than individual criminal responsibility, torture is prohibited as a 
criminal offence to be punished under national law; in addition, all States 
Parties to the relevant treaties have been granted, and are obliged to exercise, 
jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and punish offenders. Thus, in human 
rights law too, the prohibition of torture extends to and has a direct bearing on 
the criminal liability of individuals.”128
Even though the ICTY not explicitly referred to torture as an international crime, the Court 
stressed that individuals have criminal liability. The Court further stated that all State 
Parties to ‘the relevant treaties’ have a right and duty to enforce this liability through 
criminal proceedings. ‘Relevant treaties’ seems here to refer to human rights treaties such 
as ICCPR, ACHR and ECHR.129 This implies that State Parties to either of these 
conventions, which constitute the great majority of States, have accepted that torture 
creates individual criminal liability.  
US courts have further in the Filartiga case expressed that torture is an act which 
clearly is prohibited by international law: 
“Having examined the sources from which customary international law is 
derived the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists we 
conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The 
prohibition is clear and ambiguous”.130
On the basis of the customary recognition of the definition of torture in CAT, the 
widespread prohibition in domestic law and the clear prohibition against torture under 
treaty and customary international law, the right of the individual to predict the lawfulness 
                                                 
127 See Ingelse (2001), p. 324-5. 
128 See the Furundzjia case, § 145. 
129 See ICCPR article 2 paragraph 3 litra a in conjunction with article 7, ACHR articles 2 and 25 in 
conjunction with article 5 paragraph 2 and ECHR articles 1 and 13 in conjunction with article 3. The extent 
to which State Parties to these conventions have a duty to prosecute torture is further elaborated on in 
subsection 4.3.2. 
130 See the Filartiga case, last paragraph under part II. 
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 of his or her acts does not appear violated by the recognition of torture as a separate 
international crime. 
2.7.3 Universal condemnation and concern over crimes of torture 
Further requirements for recognizing torture as a separate international crime is that the 
crime is universally condemned, that the international community is concerned with the 
crime and that the crime of a valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the territorial State. 
The establishment and wide formal adherence to CAT, combined with domestic 
criminalization of torture in most States, proves that torture is the subject of universal 
condemnation as a serious crime. 
 Furthermore, the jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture provides 
evidence that States in general have an interest in the enforcement of liability for violations 
of the norm, independent of where the violations have occurred and the nationality of the 
violator. This must be a rational conclusion since no derogation from jus cogens norms is 
allowed. The jus cogens nature of the norm could therefore be argued to constitute a valid 
ground for other States to prosecute violations of the norm. 
 The fact that torture seldom is prosecuted in the territorial State is a pragmatic 
argument which support the jus cogens argument. The territorial State should not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over a serious crime such as torture when territorial States have 
proved unwilling to prosecute these acts. Since CAT imposes a duty to criminalize 
extraterritorial acts of torture, and extradite or prosecute alleged torturers present in the 
State’s territory, the adoption and recognition of this Convention illustrates that States 
recognize the need for other States to react upon crimes of torture committed abroad 
among foreigners.  
In the Furundzjia case, the ICTY further stated: 
“The existence of this corpus of general and treaty rules proscribing torture 
shows that the international community, aware of the importance of outlawing 
this heinous phenomenon, has decided to suppress any manifestation of 
torture by operating both at the interstate level and at the level of individuals. 
No legal loopholes have been left.”131
The statement that “no legal loopholes have been left” indicates that the ICTY has 
accepted torture as an international crime under customary law. Further support for this 
                                                 
131 See the Furundzjia case, § 146. 
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 interpretation is found in another paragraph of the judgment, where the ICTY refers to “the 
inherently universal character of the crime”.132  
 In the Pinochet case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson maintained that torture is an 
international crime also when committed in peace time: 
“In the early years state torture was one of the elements of a war crime. In 
consequence torture, and various other crimes against humanity, were linked 
to war or at least to hostilities of some kind. But in the course of time this 
linkage with war fell away and torture, divorced from war or hostilities, 
became an international crime on its own (emphasis added)”.133  
The interpretation that torture has become an international crime of its own is supported by 
Antonio Cassese,134 Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrahams,135 Ian Seidermann136 and 
Farhad Malekian.137
2.7.4 Conclusion 
Although certain commentators argue that torture not yet has developed into an 
international crime, the arguments drawn from the available sources provide substantial 
support for the conclusion that torture fulfils the main requirements for being defined as an 
international crime. It is especially important in this regard that the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege does not appear challenged by this conclusion. In the present thesis, 
torture is thus referred to as an international crime. 
                                                 
132 See the Furundzjia case, § 156. The passage cited will be further analysed in section 4.3.4. 
133 See note 88, p. 10. 
134 See Cassese (2003), p. 117. 
135 See Ratner and Abrams (2001), p. 118. 
136 See Seiderman (2001), pp. 127-8. 
137 See Malekian, International Criminal Law. The Legal and Critical Analysis of International Crime 
(1991), pp. 405-8. 
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 3 Universal jurisdiction in doctrine 
3.1 Introduction 
As elaborated on section 1.2, the controversial nature of universal jurisdiction is due to the 
political implications which may arise when this form of jurisdiction is exercised. The 
controversy is also caused by the fact that there is of yet no authoritative definition or 
interpretation of the universality principle, which is the principle this jurisdiction is 
referred to be based on.138
The wide diversity of opinions on universal jurisdiction increases the challenge of a 
legal examination. An understanding of its historical background and political rationale is 
helpful when evaluating the legal material of relevance. The presentation of the 
development of universal jurisdiction in doctrine below will accordingly serve as an 
introduction to the legal analysis in chapter 4 and 5. 
The objective of the examination of doctrine is to single out different conceptions of 
universal jurisdiction and the grounds upon which these can be based. The aim is not to 
present a chronological historical account. The difference in conceptions regards the scope 
of crimes covered and the criteria for its exercise. There is further a distinction between a 
discretional right and an international duty to exercise universal jurisdiction. The 
difference in rationale is related to the classical conflict between natural law theory and 
legal positivism.139
3.2 The territorial State has an exclusive right to prosecute 
The medieval Italian city-States, characterized as such from the middle of the 13th century 
until the beginning of the 16th century,140 were the first to work out a code comparable to 
                                                 
138 Authoritative statements which address selected aspect of the principle are examined below in chapter 4. 
139 According to natural law theory, the law is perceptible by reason as belonging to human nature or implicit 
in the nature of rational thought and action. Under this theory, moral values are universal and the basis for 
legal rules binding upon all States. Legal positivism postulates, on the other hand, that legal rules are valid 
only when they are enacted by the ‘sovereign’ or derive logically from existing decisions delivered by 
authoritative bodies. Under this latter approach, ideal or moral considerations without a positive legal basis 
are denied and not should in any way limit the operation or scope of the law. See the article "Philosophy of 
law", Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=115100 (visited 05.04.04). 
140 See the article “Signoria”, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=69476 
(visited 02.02.04). 
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 modern international law.141 These city-States recognized jurisdiction primarily for the 
courts covering the place of the crime, the locus delicti. Alternatively, the courts covering 
the place of domicile of the offender were recognized.142 In the case of vagabonds, 
jurisdiction for the courts where a vagabond where taken into custody, judex 
deprehensionis, could be recognized, but only if it proved difficult or impossible to 
prosecute the vagabond in the courts covering the place of the crime.143 The jurisdiction of 
the custodial State was not recognized under any other circumstances by the medieval 
Italian city-States. 
 In the 18th century, important political philosophers such as Charles-Louis de 
Secondat Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Voltaire, the pseudonym of François-
Marie Arouet, supported the main rule in the referred practice.144 They argued that crimes 
only are to be prosecuted in the territory where they have been committed. This body of 
thought developed into a theory of territoriality, whose foundation was inspired by 
pragmatic as well as moral concerns. Firstly, the territory of the national State was where 
the evidence was available and where criminal prosecution would have the best deterrent 
effect. Secondly, man should only be punished in the place where he had infringed the law, 
as the content of the legal rules varied from State to State. Thirdly, since a crime was 
considered a violation of the social contract, it was considered reasonable that the offender 
was punished where the contract had been breached.145 Cesare Beccaria, an Italian 
criminologist and economist, argued eloquently for this theory of territoriality in his much 
celebrated book Dei delitti e delle pene (Crimes and Punishment) from 1764: 
“There are those who think, that an act of cruelty committed, for example, at 
Constantinople, may be punished at Paris; for this abstracted reason, that he 
who offends humanity, should have enemies in all mankind, and be the object 
of universal execration; as if the judges were to be the knights errant of 
human nature in general, rather than guardians of particular conventions 
between men. The place of punishment can certainly be no other, than that 
where the crime was committed; for the necessity of punishing an individual 
for the general good subsists there, and there only.”146
                                                 
141 See the article "International law", Encyclopædia Britannica Online, http://search.eb.com/ebi/article?eu= 
297015 (visited 02.02.04). 
142 See Reydams (2003), p. 29. 
143 Ibid. 
144 For further references, see the Separate opinion of Guillaume to the Arrest warrant case, p. 2, § 4, note 3. 
145 See Cassese (2003), p. 278. 
146 Cited with original references in Cassese (2003), p. 278, note 1. 
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 The main rationale behind this approach is to a large extent still valid. It is e.g. undisputed 
that a crime preferably is prosecuted in the State where a crime has been. On the other 
hand have most publicists on international law accepted the need for a more flexible 
approach to criminal jurisdiction.147
3.3 The custodial State has a duty to extradite or prosecute 
3.3.1 All serious crimes 
While the territorial theory essentially was in line with the practice of the medieval Italian 
city-States, the sixteenth-century Spanish author Diego Covarruvias found it unreasonable 
that only vagabonds should be subjected to the jurisdiction of the place of arrest. He argued 
that the State having custody of the defendant had a duty to contribute to the prosecution of 
all serious crimes, either by extraditing the offender for the purpose of prosecution, or 
alternatively prosecute the crime itself. The duty was based on natural law theories, where 
the principle idea was that it was intolerable to let foreign criminals take refuge in other 
States in order to enjoy the fruits of their crimes.148 Covarruvias stressed the negative 
obligation not to shield a fugitive criminal from prosecution rather than a positive right to 
exercise universal jurisdiction.149
3.3.2 Only crimes against the law of nature or of nations 
Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist who became one of the fathers of modern international law, 
published the book De jure belli ac pacis (On the Law of War and Peace) in 1625. This 
became one of the foundational works of international law. In his arguments, Grotius 
agreed with Covarruvias on several points. Nevertheless, where Covarruvias argued that all 
serious crimes were covered by the duty to extradite or prosecute, Grotius made a 
distinction between regular crimes and crimes that “excessively violate the law of nature or 
of nations”.150 Only in regard to the last category would the duty to extradite or prosecute 
apply. Ordinary crimes “should be left to the States themselves and their rulers, to be 
punished or condoned at their discretion”.151 Furthermore, according to Grotius, the 
                                                 
147 Henry A. Kissinger is a commentator who appears more conservative in his approach to criminal 
jurisdiction than most others, see Kissinger, “The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction” in Foreign Affairs, 
July/August 2001. 
148 For original references, see the Separate opinion of Guillaume to the Arrest warrant case, § 4, note 2. 
149 See Reydams (2003), p. 37. 
150 Ibid., p. 35 with references. 
151 Ibid., p. 35, with original references in note 36. 
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 custodial State had a duty to extradite or prosecute only if another State made an appeal 
and the alleged offender was found guilty by the courts of the custodial State.152
3.3.3 The modern treaty obligation aut dedere aut judicare 
The doctrine established by Covarruvias and further developed by Grotius is the basis for 
the modern treaty obligation to extradite or prosecute; in latin “aut dedere aut judicare”.153 
This formula has been adopted in a wide range of international treaties on the enforcement 
and punishment of crimes of international concern.154
The recognition of this duty is, however, no longer based on natural law theories. 
The predominant view under current international law is that States are bound by positive 
international law only, as expressed in treaty or customary law. 
3.4 The custodial State has a right to extradite or prosecute 
3.4.1 Recognition in scholarly works 
One of the first academic attempts to unite the States’ conception of universal jurisdiction 
was made by the highly regarded L’Institut de Droit International (hereafter the Institute) 
in 1883.155 According to the resolution adopted by the Institute, the custodial State had a 
right to prosecute an alleged offender present in its territory. 156 The right was subsidiary to 
the right of the territorial State or the national State. The jurisdiction of the custodial State 
was only accepted if extradition to one of these other States was denied due to ‘barbaric 
justice’ or danger due to revolution or war.157 There was no requirement of an appeal from 
another State, but there had to be prima facie evidence of a serious crime. The scope of 
crimes covered was not limited to international crimes. 
 By the beginning of the twentieth century, many States had incorporated subsidiary 
conditioned universal jurisdiction as a discretional right for all serious crimes.158 
Recognition of this jurisdiction can also be identified in several international resolutions 
                                                 
152 Ibid., p. 36. 
153 The original formulation of Covarruvias was ‘judex requisitus vel remittere tenetur, vel delingquentem 
ipsum punire’, ibid., p. 29, note 8 with accompanying text. 
154 For a thorough presentation of the duty to extradite or prosecute in international law, see Bassiouni and 
Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or prosecute in International Law (1995). 
155 The Institute was founded in 1873 as a private and purely scientific association with the aim to promote 
the progression of international law. For more information, see http://www.idi-iil.org/ (visited 04.02.04). 
156 See article 10, translated into English in Reydams (2003), p. 30. 
157 The term ‘barbaric justice’ derives from the official comment on article 10 by von Bar and Brusa, 
translated into English in Reydams (2003), p. 30. 
158 See Reydams (2003), p. 31, with references in note 17. 
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 and drafts adopted in the first part of the twentieth century: the 1927 Warsaw Conference 
for the Unification of Penal Law,159 the resolution of the 1932 Hague International 
Congress of Comparative Law160 and the 1935 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime by Harvard Research in International Law.161  
 L’Institut de Droit International adopted a new resolution on criminal jurisdiction in 
1931. This Resolution provided a right to exercise conditioned universal jurisdiction only 
over delicta juris gentium, i.e. crimes against the law of nations. The only condition set 
forth in this version was that the accused was not requested extradited, or alternatively, that 
the territorial State or the national State did not accept an extradition offer.162
Conditioned universal jurisdiction for serious ‘ordinary’ crimes was again recognized 
in the 1965 Draft European Convention on Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters.163 
The explanatory comment issued by the Council of Europe reflects the philosophy 
underlying the draft: 
“The universality principle is, of course, the principle whereby the court of 
the place in which the offender is located (judex deprehensionis) is competent 
to hear the case, irrespective of the place of commission and of the nationality 
of the offender or his victim. The principle arose from the need to ensure the 
safety of certain basic values in which every State has an equal concern. 
These are either fundamental values such as life, sexual morality, family 
morality or property, which are protected by all penal codes or interests 
protected by international conventions and jus cogens gentium.”164
Unknown for what reason, the draft was never proposed for adoption.165 The wide scope of 
universal jurisdiction might have been the actual reason, but there is no official statement 
on the issue.  
3.4.2 Natural law theory versus unilateral positivism 
While Covarruvias and partly Grotius based their theory on natural law, not all the 
members of the Institute found support in natural law ideas on universal justice and 
solidarity among nations.166 Among them was Emile Brusa, one of the Institute’s official 
Rapporteurs under the 1883 session, who preferred a more positivistic approach. Brusa 
                                                 
159 See articles 6 and 7, cited in Reydams (2003), p. 32, note 21. 
160 See article 4, cited in Reydams (2003), p. 32, note 22. 
161 See article 9 and 10, cited in Reydams (2003), p. 32, note 23. 
162 See article 5, translated into English in Reydams (2003), p. 37. 
163 See article 5, cited in Reydams (2003), p. 73-4. 
164 Article-by article comment by Rapporteur de Grailly, § 34, cited in Reydams (2003), p. 74. 
165 See Reydams (2003), p. 73. 
166 See Reydams (2003), p. 30 with references. 
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 based the jurisdiction of the custodial State upon the State’s territorial sovereignty.167 
Under this approach, the idea was that “[t]he culpable act travels with the offender”.168 The 
State is therefore justified in enforcing a rule of law in regard to alien criminals that 
willingly have entered the State’s territory. 
Maurice Travers, a French doctor of international law and a successor of Brusa, 
agreed on this point. The only reason why he could accept subsidiary jurisdiction of the 
custodial State was this State’s right to protect its own interests: 
“…an offender peacefully enjoying the benefits of his misdeed encourages 
criminality and the possibility of an offender taking refuge in a State with the 
certainty that its penal law will not be applied would attract riffraff to 
hospitable countries, necessarily impacting their social order. … Extradition 
and expulsion are inadequate remedies for this double danger because the first 
is not always feasible and the latter does not produce a sufficiently moralizing 
effect.”169
Travers strongly opposed a theory of universality based on natural law ideas on moral and 
juridical solidarity among States: 
“Formulated to broadly, this theory has to be rejected. It goes against the 
nature of the penal law and against the very conception of State. Every State 
has, in principle, no other mission than to defend its own interests. Because its 
sovereignty is limited, it cannot act on behalf of all humanity; it only 
represents the Society of nations parte in qua. The nature of the State 
determines the scope of its criminal law.”170
It is interesting to note that although Travers strongly rejected the rationale of Covarruvias 
and Grotius, he adopted their main argument that the presence of an unpunished criminal is 
intolerable. This argument fit just as well with his positivistic approach based on the 
interest of single States. In practice, both approaches were reactions to the same actual 
situation and proposed the same solution, with a common ambition to end the impunity of 
alleged offenders present in the State’s territory.  
3.5 The custodial State has a primary duty to prosecute 
The doctrines presented so far regarded conditioned universal jurisdiction as a subsidiary 
means of criminal enforcement. Not every scholar has accepted this approach. 
Mikliszanski was a scholar who strongly contended the subsidiary character of universal 
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 jurisdiction. Mikliszanski was a passionate advocate of the universality theory, at least for 
the then emerging category of delicta juris gentium, international crimes. In an article in 
1936 he argued: 
“For the repression of those crimes, it is not about to assign to the State a 
simple auxiliary role, an international courtesy. It really is about giving to the 
penal norm a universally valid expression of human justice, doing away with 
every consideration of a statist and national order to rally exclusively behind 
the idea of combating the offence.”171
Under the doctrine of Mikliszanski, universal jurisdiction was just as primary as territorial 
jurisdiction or jurisdiction based on nationality in the case of international crimes: 
“This competence must be primary and obligatory, so that it is exercised in 
the name of the whole international community. Indeed, in the system of 
universal repression … the criminal judges of the entire world all represent 
the same and only justice.”172
While Beccaria strongly contended that judges are the avengers of mankind, Mikliszanski 
was of the opposite view: 
“This is one of the most interesting practical aspects of the universality 
theory: the perpetration of the offence triggers the equal competence of all 
criminal courts, but only the judge of the place of arrest may actually exercise 
jurisdiction.”173
When Covarruvias and Grotius emphasized that the custodial State could either extradite or 
prosecute, this signified that the main ambition of their argumentation was to ensure that 
no criminal enjoyed impunity by taking refuge in other States. They seem to have been of 
the opinion that the territorial State in most cases would be the best place to prosecute. 
Mikliszanski’s approach is different, as he argued that a crime against the law of nations 
truly was an offence for which each and every State had equal competence and interest in 
trying. Nonetheless, despite this seemingly unlimited universal approach, his doctrine 
required the presence of the offender. He thereby excluded absolute universal jurisdiction 
in the same manner as was proposed by Covarruvias, Grotius, Brusa and Travers. 
                                                                                                                                                    
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., p. 34 with references. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
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 3.6 Every State has a subsidiary right to prosecute 
While the earlier mentioned publicists rejected universal jurisdiction without the presence 
of an alleged offender, some current publicists accept this wide form of universal 
jurisdiction. Under this alternative doctrine on universal jurisdiction, every State has 
subject matter jurisdiction over international crimes committed abroad amongst foreigners. 
This jurisdiction is referred to as absolute universal jurisdiction since the presence of the 
alleged offender is not required. The most explicit support for absolute universal 
jurisdiction is found in the scholarly work of the Princeton Project on Universal 
Jurisdiction.174 Under Principle 1 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction: 
“…universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based on the nature of the 
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of 
the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any 
connection to the State exercising such jurisdiction.”175
Principle 1(3) reads: 
“A state may rely on universal jurisdiction as a basis for seeking the 
extradition of a person accused or convicted of committing a serious crime 
under international law as specified in Principle 2(1) provided that it has 
established a prima facie case of the person’s guilt and that the person sought 
to be extradited will be tried or the punishment carried out in accordance with 
international norms and standards on the protection of human rights in the 
context of criminal proceedings.”176
It is difficult to trace the origin of this doctrine.177 Today it is nonetheless advocated or 
accepted by publicists such as Cassese,178 Bassiouni,179 and Rosalyn Higgins.180 As 
suggested in particular by Cassese, Professor of International Law at the University of 
Florence and former President of the ICTY, this form of jurisdiction is nonetheless 
                                                 
174 The Princeton Project is sponsored by the Program in Law and Public Affairs and the Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; the International Commission of Jurists; the 
American Association for the International Commission of Jurists; the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights 
and the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights. 
175 The principles are enclosed in the Annex. 
176 Ibid. 
177 The origin of absolute universal jurisdiction in doctrine has not been clearly addressed in the literature 
examined, i.e. Cassese (2003), pp. 286-91; Reydams (2003), pp. 38-42; Shaw (2003), pp. 592-7; Broomhall 
(2003), pp. 105-127; Brownlie (2003), pp. 303-5; Higgins (1994), pp. 56-65; Randall (1987-8), pp. 785-841; 
Bassiouni (2001-2002), pp. 96-104; and Hall, “Contemporary universal jurisdiction” (2003), pp. 111-37. 
178 See Cassese (2003), pp. 286-91; and Cassese, “When may Senior State Officials Be Tried for International 
Crimes? Some Comments on The Congo v. Belgium Case” (2002), pp. 853-76. 
179 See Bassiouni (2001-2002), pp. 155-6. 
180 See Higgins (1994), p. 64. 
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 subsidiary. This entails that the jurisdiction is premised on the failure of the territorial State 
or national State to take proceedings.181
 The term ‘universal jurisdiction’ is also applied, without requiring the presence of 
the offender, in the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the US,182 the latest draft 
Resolution on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of States by L’Institut de Droit International,183 
and the draft on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.184 These 
scholarly works do not explicitly accept the validity of extradition claims based on 
universal jurisdiction, but neither do they exclude absolute universal jurisdiction, as the 
earlier scholarly works referred to in section 3.4.1 did.185
                                                 
181 See Cassese (2003), p. 287. 
182 See the Restatement (1987), Sections 404 and 423. 
183 See Reydams (2003), p. 41, citing article 8 and 4. 
184 See the draft articles 4 and 5. 
185 Reydams expresses no doubt when he interprets the Restatement and the latest Resolution of the Institute 
to recognize absolute universal jurisdiction, see Reydams (2003), p. 40-2. 
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4 Universal jurisdiction over torture under customary law 
4.1 Introduction 
After having analysed the international recognition of the prohibition against torture in 
chapter two, and thereafter presented different conceptions of universal jurisdiction in 
doctrine in chapter three, the study will in the following examine whether, or to what 
extent, there is a relationship between torture and universal jurisdiction under customary 
law. 
As universal jurisdiction provides extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, the content 
and scope of universal jurisdiction is regulated by the legal premises for extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction. These premises are unfortunately not clear under international law, 
making the identification of the relevant rules a task of its own. The question of debate is 
primarily whether extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction can be claimed unilaterally on the 
basis of State sovereignty, or whether it requires authority from a rule recognized in treaty 
or customary law. 
The position that every State has extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the basis of 
State sovereignty is supported by the fact that this jurisdiction is exercised within the 
territory of the legislative State. As long as jurisdiction is not exercised on the territory of 
another State, the adherents of this position argues that limitations to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction must follow from a clear rule of international law. 
The position that extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has to be recognized by a rule 
of international law is buttressed by respect for the sovereignty of the territorial State and 
the fundamental territorial character of criminal law. The advocates of this approach do not 
accept the territorial sovereignty of a legislating State as a sufficient basis for exercising 
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad amongst foreigners. 
The content of each position and their support in international sources will be 
examined in section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses thereafter on what grounds, and to what 
extent, universal jurisdiction over torture is lawful under customary law under both 
approaches. If it is found to be lawful, it will further be examined whether States may have 
a duty under customary law to apply universal jurisdiction over torture. 
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 4.2 The legal premises for universal jurisdiction  
4.2.1 Introduction to the Lotus judgment 
The question of whether every State has extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the basis of 
its own sovereignty has a long history of debate in international discourse. So far, the only 
authoritative discussion of the issue has been provided by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (hereafter PCIJ) in 1927 in the Lotus case.186 The topic of dispute was 
whether Turkey had extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction to prosecute a French public 
official. The Frenchman was accused of involuntary manslaughter on the high seas causing 
Turkish casualties. 
The Court did not discuss the issue of universal jurisdiction, but it did elaborate on 
the legal premises for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. The Court presented first a 
‘general rule’ on extraterritorial jurisdiction, after which it presented a potential lex 
specialis with application only to criminal jurisdiction. 
The content of the ‘general rule’ was in line with the position presented above that 
States unilaterally have competence to prosecute crimes committed abroad. This 
jurisdiction was based on the territorial sovereignty of legislating State and was lawful as 
long as it did not violate other rules of international law. The position covered by this 
‘general rule’ will in the following be referred to as the ‘main rule’. 
The rule proposed as ‘lex specialis’ for criminal jurisdiction corresponds in large 
parts to the more restrictive approach introduces above. Under this rule, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would only be lawful if it had a legal basis in international law. It is interesting 
to note that the rationale presented by the PCIJ in favour of a possible alternative rule for 
criminal jurisdiction was the special nature of criminal law, not the territorial sovereignty 
of the territorial State. The position covered by this ‘lex specialis’ will in the following be 
referred to as the ‘alternative rule’. 
The Court did not conclude on which rule applied to criminal jurisdiction as this 
was found to be irrelevant for the case at hand. If the alternative rule had applied to 
criminal law, the main rule would necessarily only cover extraterritorial civil jurisdiction. 
If the alternative rule did not apply, both civil and criminal jurisdiction would be regulated 
by the main rule. 
                                                 
186 Se note 38. 
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 The Lotus judgment has been central in the international discussion on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, but the judgment is not easily applied as a guideline to the rules 
on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Firstly, since the Court found it unnecessary to 
decide whether the alternative rule really applied criminal jurisdiction, it is difficult to 
determine whether the PCIJ thereby regarded the main rule to apply until international law 
clarified the question. 
 Secondly, on the basis that there was a strong dissent on the obiter dictum 
concerning the main rule on extraterritorial jurisdiction, the authority of Lotus has been 
questioned in legal theory.187 The majority won due to the double vote of the President, 
meaning that a substantial minority of the judges did not agree that States in principle can 
base extraterritorial jurisdiction on their own sovereignty. 
 Despite the fact that the interpretation of Lotus varies in legal theory, the relevant 
statements by the PCIJ form the basis for following analysis of customary law. In spite of 
its age and disputed character, the Lotus judgment is important as a point of departure. 
4.2.2 Introduction to the individual opinions to the Arrest Warrant case 
The contentious and undetermined scope and nature of criminal extraterritorial jurisdiction 
was confirmed in the separate and dissenting opinions in the Arrest warrant case in 2002. 
The Arrest warrant case concerned the lawfulness of an arrest warrant issued on the basis 
of absolute universal jurisdiction. The warrant was issued by Belgium against the 
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo. While the 
judgement itself only addressed the issue of immunity, several of the judges chose to 
elaborate on the legality of absolute universal jurisdiction in separate and dissenting 
opinions.188 These opinions are thus of interest for the analysis of the two conflicting 
approaches to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and the current relevance and weight of 
the Lotus judgment. 
The individual opinions of the ICJ judges differed greatly and serve to illustrate the 
divide between those who argue that the main rule applies to criminal jurisdiction and 
                                                 
187 The theoretical controversy over the Lotus case in this regard is addressed e.g. in Schachter, International 
law in theory and practice (1991), pp. 250-2; and Spierman, Moderne folkerett - etter det 20. århundre 
(1999), pp. 118-25. 
188 The ICJ has established a well-founded principle that hinders it from adjudicating other questions than the 
subject matter question put forward to them by the parties. As stated in 1959 in the Asylum case, the Court 
has a “duty not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final submissions of the parties, but also to 
abstain from deciding points not included in those submissions”, see the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, p. 402. 
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 those who argue that the alternative rule applies. An examination of their views is 
accordingly of relevance when discussing the content and implications of the main rule and 
the alternative rule in regard to criminal jurisdiction, as well as the arguments invoked in 
favour of each approach. 
 Judge Gilbert Guillaume, at the time President of the ICJ (France), the three judges 
Rosalyn Higgins (UK), Pieter H. Kooijmans (Netherlands) and Thomas Buergenthal 
(USA),189 and ad hoc judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (Belgium) provide the most 
interesting opinions in regard to universal jurisdiction. For the purpose of this thesis it is 
sufficient to give attention to their opinions. 
4.2.3 Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction based on territorial sovereignty 
4.2.3.1 The content of the main rule presented by the PCIJ 
The independence or sovereignty of the State is of importance for the determination and 
interpretation of the State’s rights and obligations under international law.190 According to 
the PCIJ in the Lotus case, an effect of State sovereignty was that any restrictions on the 
State’s exercise of legislative, judicial and executive power within its own territory had to 
be accepted by the State itself. Restrictions upon these sovereign rights could not be 
presumed.191
 As long as States did not act contrary to any of the established restrictions, States 
were regarded free to exercise State power at their own discretion. A different way of 
framing this is that the PCIJ regarded State power to be regulated by prohibitions and not 
permissive rules.192 A State act which was not prohibited was lawful in the eyes of the 
PCIJ. 
 The PCIJ stressed that most basic limitation to State sovereignty is that States 
cannot exercise State power outside their own territory: 
                                                 
189 Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal presented their view in a Joint separate opinion. 
190 A theoretical question which will not be pursued here is whether State sovereignty is created by 
international law as a legal order, or whether it is inherent in the States prior to the creation of international 
law. For an interesting elaboration on different approaches to the relationship between state sovereignty and 
international law, see Spierman (1999), pp. 17-23. 
191 See the Lotus judgment, p. 5. See also the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, where the court stated that “in 
international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by 
treaty or otherwise”, note 81, p. 135, § 269. 
192 The majority of the ICJ seems to have supported this view also in the advisory opinion on the Legality of 
the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons: “State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons 
as such does not result from an absence of authorisation but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of 
prohibition”, see ICJ Reports 1996, p. 247. 
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 “Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may 
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this 
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State 
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from convention.”193
Extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction per se was not regarded an exercise of State power 
outside the State’s territory.194 As long as it was enforced within the State’s territory and 
not contrary to other international rules, the PCIJ argued that States had a wide margin of 
discretion in the case of extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
“Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not 
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their court to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect 
a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable (emphasis added).”195
When the reference to ‘principles’ is read in its context, the PCIJ seems to imply that 
States as a main rule are free to apply jurisdictional principles in accordance with their own 
interpretation of their content and scope.196 This interpretation further is supported by the 
PCIJ’s statement later in the judgment where the main rule is referred to as the ‘principle 
of freedom’: 
“According to … the principle of freedom, in virtue of which each State may 
regulate its legislation at its discretion, provided that in doing so it does not 
come in conflict with a restriction imposed by international law…”197
The PCIJ did not specify in this statement which prohibitive rules the Court had in mind 
when it stressed that extraterritorial jurisdiction had its limitations. The most important 
limitation had already had been stressed by the PCIJ, i.e. that no State may exercise 
jurisdiction outside their own territory. The relevance of this prohibition in regard to 
universal jurisdiction, and especially absolute universal jurisdiction, will be examined in 
section 4.2.3.2. 
The relevance of other prohibitive rules was perhaps difficult to address as they in 
practice depend on the developing status of international law and the facts of a case. A 
                                                 
193 See the Lotus judgment, p. 5. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
196 For a more restrictive interpretation of the PCIJ’s reference to ’principles’, see Reydams (2003), p. 21. 
197 See the Lotus judgment, p. 6. 
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 prohibitive rule of general relevance in the case of torture is the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other States. This principle will be examined in regard 
to torture below in section 4.3.2. Other prohibitive rules of potential relevance in the case 
of torture are the international rules on immunity. Nonetheless, due to the limitations of the 
thesis, these rules will not be discussed.198
4.2.3.2 Absolute universal jurisdiction and the requirement that no extraterritorial 
jurisdiction may be exercised outside the territory of the legislating State 
A basic criterion under the main rule presented above is that extraterritorial jurisdiction 
cannot be exercised outside the territory of the legislating State. Since the basis for the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is the territorial sovereignty of the legislating State, the exercise 
of jurisdiction must be limited to this State’s territory. In the wording of the PCIJ, a State 
“may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State”.199 If State power 
is enforced outside the territory, the State needs competence according to a rule of 
international law, or alternatively consent from the State whose interests are affected.  
 The requirement that jurisdiction has to be exercised within the territory of the State 
is not particularly problematic with respect to conditioned universal jurisdiction. This form 
of universal jurisdiction covers only alleged offenders present in the territory of the State 
by their own will. Jurisdiction may as a result be fully exercised within the territory of the 
State.200
 Absolute universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, covers all alleged offenders 
irrespective of where they are located geographically. If the State claiming absolute 
universal jurisdiction is to be able to give the defendant the right to be present during his or 
her own prosecution,201 custody over the defendant has to be obtained by means of 
extradition from a third State on the basis of an international arrest warrant. 
 Since prosecution on the basis of absolute universal jurisdiction requires an 
extradition act from a third State, and since extradition here implies the exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction outside the State claiming absolute universal jurisdiction, the 
question arises whether absolute universal jurisdiction is fully enforced within the territory 
of the State. As suggested by ad hoc Judge Van den Wyngaert in her Dissenting opinion to 
the Arrest Warrant case: 
                                                 
198 See the delimitation in subsection 1.3.1. 
199 See note 194. 
200 The collection of evidence in other States would naturally require the consent of the relevant States. 
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 “…it might be argued that circulating a warrant internationally brings it 
within the realm of enforcement jurisdiction, which, under the “Lotus” test, is 
in principle prohibited.”202
The PCIJ did not raise the question of whether issuances of international arrest warrants 
and extradition claims, followed by third States’ compliance with such requests, 
constituted extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. Neither did the Court bring up the 
question of the rights of individuals to be present in their own trial. Based on the lack of 
affirmative pronouncements, the PCIJ appears to have regarded requests for extradition as 
unproblematic or even irrelevant for the question of subject matter jurisdiction. However, 
given that the Court did not address the issue, and in view of the fact that the main 
prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement still applies, the nature of extradition 
claims and their effect must be subject to further examination.  
 The lawfulness of arrest warrants and extradition claims was discussed in the Arrest 
warrant case. The interpretation set forward by the ICJ did not explicitly define the concept 
of extraterritorial enforcement, but the Court did discuss the nature and effects of the 
international arrest warrant in the case before them. 
 The ICJ noted that the purpose of the distribution had been to establish a legal basis 
for the arrest and subsequent extradition of the accused Foreign Minister. The Court argued 
that even though third States would have to take further administrative and legal steps in 
order to act upon the arrest warrant, the warrant still represented an infringement of the 
sovereignty of the Congo.203 The rationale of the ICJ was that the circulation of the arrest 
warrant possibly could lead to other States taking action, thereby in itself violating the 
immunity of the Foreign Minister: 
“As in the case of the warrant’s issue, its international circulation from June 
2000 by the Belgian authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively 
infringed Mr. Yerodia’s immunity as the Congo’s incumbent Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo’s conduct of 
its international relations…”204
When the distribution of an arrest warrant is regarded to violate immunity rules, the very 
distribution of an international arrest warrant seems to imply the exercise of State power. 
The question which is not answered by the ICJ is nonetheless whether the exercise of this 
                                                                                                                                                    
201 See the rule contained in ICCPR article 14 paragraph 3 litra e, presented in subsection 1.4.3. 
202 See the Dissenting opinion of ad hoc Judge Van den Wyngaert, § 76. 
203 See the Arrest Warrant case, Judgment, § 71. 
204 Ibid. 
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 power is regarded as extraterritorial in the terminology of the PCIJ. This question was 
addressed by ad hoc judge Van den Wyngaert, and to some extent also the three judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal in their individual opinions. 
 According to Van den Wyngaert, the Belgian distribution of an arrest warrant 
through Interpol did not entail extraterritorial enforcement.205 Her argument was that the 
custodial State would have to take an authoritative decision in order to act upon the arrest 
warrant. The custodial State would therefore be the State exercising State power in its own 
territory when arresting and extraditing in accordance with the request.  
 The three judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal concluded in the same 
manner as Van den Wyngaert in their joint separate opinion. After having emphasized that 
“[t]he only prohibitive rule … is that criminal jurisdiction should not be exercised, without 
permission, within the territory of another State”,206 the judges maintain: 
“The Belgian arrest warrant envisaged the arrest of Mr. Yerodia in Belgium, 
or the possibilities of his arrest in third States at the discretion of the States 
concerned. This would in principle seem to violate no existing prohibiting 
rule of international law.”207
With respect to the possible relationship between the issuing of arrest warrants and the 
lawfulness of absolute universal jurisdiction, the three judges used the opportunity to 
suggest that there was no link: 
“Some jurisdictions provide for trial in absentia; others do not. If it is said that 
a person must be within the jurisdiction at the time of the trial itself, that may 
be a prudent guarantee for the right of fair trial but has little to do with bases 
of jurisdiction recognized under international law.”208
This last statement supports the interpretation that extradition requests was left 
unaddressed in the Lotus judgment simply because the topic was regarded irrelevant for 
the lawfulness of jurisdiction. 
 A final point of examination entails a brief look at the rules concerning undisputed 
extraterritorial enforcement, as exemplified by the Eichman case. In this case, Israeli 
Moussad agents abducted Adolf Eichman, a German war criminal, from Argentina, 
                                                 
205 See Separate opinion of ad hoc Judge Van den Wyngaert, §§ 78 and 79. 
206 See the Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal, § 54. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid., § 56. 
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 without the consent of the Argentinean Government. The purpose was to bring Eichman to 
Israel, where he in 1962 stood trial for atrocities committed during the World War Two.209  
Absolute universal jurisdiction does not provide a right to abduct an alleged 
offender, Absolute universal jurisdiction only provides competence to initiate 
investigations and issue international arrest warrants and extradition claims. When the term 
extraterritorial enforcement is applied to State sanctioned kidnapping as in the Eichman 
case, the natural meaning of the term appears more clearly than in the case of the 
circulation of international arrest warrants. Because international arrest warrants are acted 
upon by custodial States with territorial jurisdiction, it would appear far fetched to classify 
the circulation of arrest warrants as extraterritorial enforcement. 
 On the basis of the above referred statements and arguments, the conclusion is 
drawn that absolute universal jurisdiction not in itself involve or imply extraterritorial 
enforcement in the terminology of the PCIJ. According to the main rule, where States have 
extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of their own sovereignty, absolute 
universal jurisdiction is thus just as lawful as conditioned universal jurisdiction. Both 
conditioned and absolute universal jurisdiction may however be limited by other rules of 
relevance in a give case, e.g. the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other States and rules on immunity. 
4.2.4 Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction recognized by international law 
4.2.4.1 The content of the alternative rule proposed by the PCIJ 
As mentioned in subsection 4.2.1, the PCIJ did not restrict itself to only present the main 
rule. Although the PCIJ noted that nearly all systems of law had extended their application 
to crimes taking place outside their own boarders,210 the Court wondered whether there 
was an exceptional rule governing extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. The PCIJ reasoned 
that an alternative rule: 
“…might be the outcome of the close connection which for a long time 
existed between the conception of supreme criminal jurisdiction and that of a 
State, and also by the especial importance of criminal jurisdiction from the 
point of view of the individual.”211
                                                 
209 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 29 May 1962, English translation in 36 
International Law Reports p. 298. For more information on this case, see http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/ 
people/e/eichmann-adolf/ (visited 27.03.04). 
210 See the Lotus judgment, p. 6. 
211 Ibid. 
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  The rationale behind a potential lex specialis in the case of criminal jurisdiction was 
accordingly the fundamental territorial character of criminal law and the rights of the 
individual. The sovereignty of the territorial State was not explicitly invoked as an 
argument in favour of the alternative rule, but the territorial State would be the only State 
with subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of its own sovereignty. Other States would 
need authority from other rules of international law: 
“According to the other standpoint, the exclusively territorial character of law 
relating to this domain constitutes a principle which, except as otherwise 
expressly provided, would ipso facto, prevent States from extending the 
criminal jurisdiction of their own courts beyond their frontiers; the exceptions 
in question, which include for instance extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
nationals and over crimes directed against public safety, would therefore rest 
on special permissive rules forming part of international law.”212
If extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction could not be based on a treaty provision, the 
jurisdiction would have to be recognized by customary law in order to be lawful. The 
examples mentioned by the PCIJ resembles extraterritorial jurisdiction which is well 
recognized as customary law. 
In the given case, the effect was felt on a Turkish ship, constituting ‘Turkish 
territory’. On this basis, the Court found that Turkey had a form of territorial 
jurisdiction.213 Since it was generally accepted that States had jurisdiction over crimes 
having effects within their own territory, Turkey was regarded to have subject matter 
jurisdiction independent of whether the general rule or the alternative rule applied to 
criminal jurisdiction. 
Even though the PCIJ did not provide a final conclusion with respect to whether the 
alternative rule actually applied to criminal jurisdiction, the Court stressed that in the event 
that it would have reached the conclusion that the alternative rule applied, rules prohibiting 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be equally important as under the main rule:  
“Consequently, whichever of the two systems described above be adopted, the 
same result will be arrived at in this particular case: the necessity of 
ascertaining whether or not under international law there is a principle which 
would have prohibited Turkey, in the circumstances before the Court, from 
prosecuting Lieutenant Demons…” 214
                                                 
212 Ibid. 
213 This form of territorial jurisdiction is referred to as objective territorial jurisdiction in current doctrine. 
214 See the Lotus judgment, p. 7. 
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 Independent of whether States have subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of State 
sovereignty or a rule of international law, prosecution would accordingly be unlawful if it 
conflicted with other rules of international law applicable in the given case. Prohibitive 
rules are thus of relevance also when extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is recognized for 
a certain crime under a rule of international law.215
4.2.5 The difficult assessment of the current status of customary law 
4.2.5.1 Arguments in favour of the main rule 
The fact that the PCIJ suggested an alternative rule, without offering any conclusion on the 
matter, has not barred experienced interpreters of international law from invoking Lotus in 
support of the rule that every State have extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the basis of 
their own sovereignty. 
Ad hoc Judge in the Arrest warrant case Van den Wyngaert, also ad litem judge of 
the ICTY, concluded in her dissenting opinion to the Arrest Warrant case that the Lotus 
judgment affords States full freedom to apply extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction as long 
as it is not prohibited by other international rules: 
“It follows from the “Lotus” case that a State has the right to provide 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on its territory unless there is a problem under 
international law…”216
The same view seems to be shared by Professor Cassese, former President of the ICTY: 
“Under the general principle enunciated in 1927 by the PCIJ in Lotus, States 
are free to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over acts performed outside 
their territory, whenever no specific international limitations (provided for 
either in treaties or in customary rules) restrict such freedom…”217
Their rationale for this interpretation is not elaborated on in their individual opinions to the 
Arrest warrant case, but it is probably linked to the fact that the alternative rule never was 
confirmed by the PCIJ. As long as the validity of an exceptional rule is unclear, it can be 
argued that the safest approach is to apply the main rule. 
The rationale behind the rule that every State has extraterritorial jurisdiction on the 
basis of the State’s own sovereignty is furthermore related to the unilateral, positivistic 
                                                 
215 See subsection 4.2.3.2. 
216 The Dissenting opinion of ad hoc Judge Van den Wyngaert, p. 26, § 51. 
217 See Cassese (2003), p. 303: 
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 approach advocated by Brusa and Travers.218 The link to Brusa and Travers is nonetheless 
only present when an accused perpetrator is within the territory of the state by his or her 
own free will. Only in these situations will the accused represent a threat to the custodial 
state and its rule of law. When the alleged offender is outside the territory of the State, as 
in the case of absolute universal jurisdiction, the main argument for jurisdiction is not the 
interests of an individual state, but rather the interests of the international community of 
States as a whole. 
4.2.5.2 Arguments in favour of the alternative rule 
The fact that the PCIJ presented an alternative rule could on the other hand imply that the 
Lotus judgment does not provide support for any fixed rule in regard to extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction. The rationale behind this approach is, briefly stated, that by 
suggesting an alternative rule without concluding, the Lotus case explicitly acknowledged 
the ambiguous stance of international law with respect to this legal problem. If this 
conclusion prevails, customary law has to be determined on the basis of the developments 
in international law after Lotus. 
ICJ judge Guillaume, President of the ICJ at the time when the Arrest Warrant case 
was adjudicated, is a prominent advocate of the approach that States need a basis in 
international law in order to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.219 Guillaume’s 
view is expressed in his Separate opinion in the Arrest warrant case. He concluded in his 
opinion that criminal jurisdiction today is governed by the alternative rule, requiring that 
States claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction have authority under an explicit rule of 
international law. Since Guillaume himself not is an authoritative interpreter of 
international law when he expresses his views in a separate opinion, each of his arguments 
should be presented and evaluated before the validity of his rationale can be assessed. 
 The first argument forwarded by Guillaume in support of the alternative rule is the 
UN Charter’s recognition of the sovereign equality of States.220 He suggested further that 
the emergence of new States born of decolonization provides similar support for the rule 
that States need authority in international law in order to apply extraterritorial criminal 
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219 See the Separate opinion of President Guillaume, § 15. 
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 jurisdiction.221 Moreover, Guillaume derived arguments from the extensive adoption and 
recognition of treaty law in the field of international criminal law: 
“International criminal law has itself undergone considerable development 
and constitutes today an impressive legal corpus. It recognizes in many 
situations the possibility, or indeed the obligation, for a State other than that 
on whose territory the offence was committed to confer jurisdiction on its 
courts to prosecute the authors of certain crimes where they are present on its 
territory. International criminal courts have been created. But at no time has it 
been envisaged that jurisdiction should be conferred upon the courts of every 
State in the world to prosecute such crimes, whoever their authors and victims 
and irrespective of the place where the offender is to be found.”222
Hence, in situations without a solid basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, Guillaume 
emphasised the need to respect the sovereignty of the territorial State. In his view, the 
application of universal jurisdiction without a permissive rule would threaten, not ensure 
international justice.223 The viewpoint of Guillaume will now be discussed. 
 Guillaume invokes State sovereignty and equality as an argument in favour of the 
alternative rule. He argues that the recognition of State equality in the UN charter and the 
appearance of ‘new States born of decolonization’ have strengthened the territorial 
principle. It can be agreed that State sovereignty supports the alternative rule in the sense 
that every State has a primary and exclusive right to enforce a rule of law in its own 
territory. On the other hand, in the view of the PCIJ, State sovereignty also supports the 
main rule, under which State sovereignty is the basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction as long 
as extraterritorial jurisdiction is enforced within the State’s own territory.224 According to 
the PCIJ, it was the special character of criminal law which provided the main argument 
for an alternative rule in regard to criminal jurisdiction, not State sovereignty per se. State 
sovereignty is accordingly not an argument which only provides support for Guillaume’s 
conclusion. It is important to stress in this context that the sovereignty of the territorial 
State is protected by the principle of non-interference, but this principle should be 
examined in regard to each and not as a general prohibition against extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction.225  
 Guillaume continues by referring to the developments in international criminal law. 
Criminal jurisdiction in regard to the most serious international crimes has to a large extent 
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 51 
 been regulated in international legal instruments. Treaty law imposes today a duty to apply 
conditioned universal jurisdiction in certain situations. Nonetheless, this observation does 
not provide authoritative support for the conclusion that the right to apply extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction has to have a similar legal basis. It is therefore difficult to assess the 
relevance of this development without any further authoritative support. 
 Guillaume’s final argument is that universal jurisdiction which is not recognized by 
an explicit rule of international law, would threaten, and not ensure, international justice. 
This is perhaps the most important argument in favour of the alternative rule. The 
politically controversial aspect of international criminal law suggests that enforcement of 
individual accountability preferably should be regulated by explicit rules accepted by the 
community of States. This would provide better predictability and stability in the 
distribution of criminal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would strengthen the political support 
for enforcement across the territorial boarders in the most important situations. The only 
drawback is that it probably is a policy argument with limited legal weight. It may 
influence the further development of international criminal law, but at present it does not 
solve the question of whether the alternative, rather than the main rule, now applies to 
criminal jurisdiction. 
It could be mentioned that the position invoked by Guillaume to a certain extent is 
related to the doctrine of e.g. Beccaria.226 In the view of Beccaria, a crime should be 
prosecuted and punished in the place where the crime was committed. This was where the 
damage had been inflicted and accordingly where justice should be fulfilled. Judges were 
not the avengers of all mankind and should not adjudicate acts committed outside the 
boarders for their own territorial jurisdiction. Nonetheless, while Beccaria in theory 
rejected all form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, the alternative rule as advocated 
by Guillaume recognizes extraterritorial jurisdiction as long as it is provided for by a rule 
of international law. Guillaume recognizes accordingly a need for a flexible administration 
of criminal jurisdiction as long as the authority for such jurisdiction originates from rules 
consented upon by the international community of States, not from the sovereignty of the 
individual State. 
                                                                                                                                                    
225 As informed above, this principle will be examined in regard to the prosecution of torture in section 4.3.2. 
226 See section 3.2. 
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 4.2.5.3 Preliminary conclusion 
Until the premises for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction are addressed in an authoritative 
source, it remains an unresolved topic of debate which rule applies to criminal jurisdiction. 
The position that States have extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the basis of their 
status as sovereign nations appears to have more authoritative support than the alternative 
position, but it is difficult to argue that the support derived from the Lotus judgment is 
clear and persuasive. The judgement is in addition old and legal scholars disagree on the 
relevance of Lotus for the current status of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and the 
judgment. 
The position that Lotus is loosing its relevance seems to be supported by the ICJ 
judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their Joint separate opinion to the Arrest 
Warrant case. Although admitting that the Lotus dictum “represents a continuing potential 
in the context of jurisdiction over international crimes”,227 the judges added that the dictum 
represented “the high water mark of laissez-faire in international relations” and that this 
“era has been significantly overtaken by other tendencies”.228
Another publicist who has chosen to emphasis that tings have changed since Lotus is 
Malcolm N. Shaw, Professor of International Law at the University of Leicester and the 
author of a bestselling textbook on international law. According to Shaw, the main rule that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction can be based on State sovereignty no longer applies under 
international law, not even in the case of civil jurisdiction: 
“The general pronouncements by the Court leading to the dismissal of the 
French contentions have been criticised by writers for a number of years, 
particularly with respect to its philosophical approach in treating States as 
possessing very wide powers of jurisdiction which could only be restricted by 
proof of a rule of international law prohibiting the action concerned. It is 
widely accepted today that the emphasis lays the other way around.”229
Furthermore, even though the legal value of Guillaume’s argumentation is limited, his 
position as ICJ judge and former President of the ICJ suggests that his view might be 
influential in the future. 
On the background of the available sources of international law it is difficult to 
conclude on whether States at present need a basis in international or whether they have 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction on the basis of their own sovereignty. No fixed, 
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 generally accepted interpretation appears available under currently international law. The 
lawfulness of conditioned and absolute universal jurisdiction over torture will therefore in 
the present thesis be evaluated under the main rule as well as the alternative rule. 
4.3 Universal jurisdiction over torture 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Independent of which rule applies to criminal jurisdiction, the exercise of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction must not violate other rules of international law. The principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of other States is relevant in this regard. Subsection 4.3.2 
examines its relevance for the application of universal jurisdiction over torture. 
 Subsections 4.3.3-4.3.6 examines thereafter legal grounds which may provide 
explicit recognition for universal jurisdiction over torture under international law. Even 
though such recognition is necessary only under the alternative rule, it may also prove 
important for the popular acceptance of universal jurisdiction under the main rule. In a 
diplomatic dispute, which is likely to erupt when State A initiates criminal proceedings 
against e.g. a former Head of State B, jurisdiction recognized in an international rule would 
provide valuable political support. The current dispute between France and the Congo 
regarding the right to France to exercise universal jurisdiction on the basis of CAT 
illustrates this point. The customary status of conditioned and absolute universal 
jurisdiction over torture will be summarized in subsections 4.3.7-4.3.8. 
4.3.2 The principle of non-interference in the domestic jurisdiction of States 
The principle of non-interference in the domestic jurisdiction of States is a corollary of 
State sovereignty and a basic norm in international customary law. Article 2 paragraph 7 of 
the UN Charter is based on this principle and expresses a general duty for the UN to 
respect the domestic jurisdiction of the State: 
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any State.”230
The principle is also adopted in the UN Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States.231
                                                                                                                                                    
229 See Shaw (2003), pp. 460-1. 
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  When the principle of non-intervention is to be applied as a legal rule, the text of 
the UN Charter is the basis for the analysis. The formulation of article 2 paragraph 7 
suggests that the principle of non-interference is a rule without exceptions, but it only 
applies to “domestic jurisdiction”. The question is then if criminal jurisdiction over torture, 
committed by a State official within the State’s territory against the State’s nationals, is an 
affair that is “essential within the domestic jurisdiction” of the State. If this is the case, the 
principle of non-interference will prohibit States from establishing and enforcing universal 
jurisdiction without the consent of the territorial State, even if the alleged offender is 
present within the territory of the State claiming universal jurisdiction. 
 The procedure of identifying domestic matters is not prescribed in the UN Charter. 
An ordinary interpretation of the words “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” 
suggests that the exclusive domestic domain is reserved for internal affairs which are 
regulated by internal law only. As stated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case: 
“A State’s domestic policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, provided of 
course that it does not violate any obligation of international law…”232
Ian Brownlie supports this perception of the domestic domain and defines its scope in the 
following manner: 
“The general position is that the ‘reserved domain’ is the domain of state 
activities where the jurisdiction of the state is not bound by international law: 
the extent of this domain depends on international law and varies according to 
its development…”233  
What has to be decided is then whether, or to what extent, the jurisdiction over torture is a 
matter regulated by international law. 
 As discussed in chapter two, the prohibition against torture has been recognized as 
a non-derogable human rights norm both under treaty and customary law. Accordingly, all 
States are prohibited from actively practicing or passively accepting torture within their 
own territory. The investigation and prosecution of torture is, nevertheless, not explicitly 
regulated by the human rights norm. The principle of non-interference could therefore be 
                                                                                                                                                    
230 The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in San Francisco 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945. 
231 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly by consensus 
on 24 October 1970. 
232 See p. 131, § 258. 
233 See Brownlie (2003), p. 291. 
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 invoked as a bar against universal jurisdiction unless also the right and duty to prosecute is 
explicitly regulated by an international rule binding upon the territorial State. 
 State Parties to CAT and the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Torture have a clear and undisputed obligation to investigate and prosecute 
torture. Prosecution of torture committed in these States could therefore hardly be 
categorized as a matter within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of these State Parties.234
 The obligation to give effect to the human right to be free from torture, including 
the duty to provide an effective remedy for violations, is further an international obligation 
of State Parties to the ICCPR. Under the ICCPR article 2, paragraph 3 litra a, State Parties 
shall undertake:  
“To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or 
by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the 
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy…”  
Article 2 does not emphasize that every violation should be addressed through legal 
proceedings, but in the case of torture, criminal investigation and legal proceedings appear 
as the most appropriate remedies in the context of the ICCPR. Of interest in this regard is 
the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No.20 to article 7 of the ICCPR:  
“The Committee has noted that some States have granted amnesty in respect 
of acts of torture. Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of 
States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within 
their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future. States 
may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including 
compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be possible.”235  
This Comment elaborates on the lawfulness of domestic amnesties, but it has relevance for 
the discussion on whether the investigation and prosecution of torture is a matter within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the territorial State. Had it had been within the exclusive domestic 
domain of State Parties to the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee would not consider it 
appropriate or even under its mandate to criticize the practice of granting domestic 
amnesties. 
The general comments of the Human Rights Committee are neither authoritative 
interpretations of customary law nor legally binding on State Parties to the ICCPR. 
                                                 
234 The content of this duty under CAT is examined in chapter 5. For a discussion on the relevance of the 
principle of non-interference in the context of CAT, see subsection 5.2.3.2. 
235 See § 15. 
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 Nonetheless they are important tools for the actual application and interpretation of State 
obligations under the ICCPR. On the basis of the text of article 2, paragraph 3 litra a and 
the General Comment to article 7, the prosecution of torture appears regulated by 
international law in the case of the 151 State Parties to the ICCPR and is accordingly not 
within their exclusive domestic jurisdiction.236
 Articles 2 and 25 of the ACHR have content similar to that of article 2 under 
ICCPR. In the view of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:  
“States Parties are obliged to take all measures to ensure that no one is 
deprived of judicial protection and the exercise of the right to a simple and 
effective recourse”237  
The Court did not state explicitly that all human rights violations have to be prosecuted, 
but maintained that amnesties in the case torture are contrary to the responsibility of State 
Parties to the ACHR as amnesties: 
“… are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance … (emphasis 
added).”238
On this basis could it be argued that criminal prosecution of torture is no issue exclusively 
regulated by the domestic law of State Parties to the ACHR. 
 According to article 1 and 13 of the ECHR, State Parties to this Convention also 
have an obligation to provide an effective remedy to individuals whose rights and 
freedoms have been violated.239 State Parties to the ECHR would therefore be under a 
similar obligation to prosecute torture committed within their own territory, implying that 
the prosecution of torture is outside the scope of their exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 
 When torture has been committed within the territory of States which are Non-Party 
States to all the referred treaties, the status of customary law becomes decisive. 
 An argument that may prove relevant in this context is the erga omens nature of the 
obligation to respect the prohibition against torture. It has been suggested in the literature 
that this obligation, which in the case of fundamental human rights is owed toward the 
entire international community, contains a duty to investigate and prosecute all alleged 
                                                 
236 Ratification status is available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapter 
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237 See the Barrios Altos case, Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. vs Peru, Judgment of March 14, 2001, § 43. 
238 See the Barrios Altos case, note 257, §§ 41.  
239 As mentioned in section 2.2, the freedom from torture is here protected in article 3. 
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 violations of torture committed within the State’s own territory.240 There is no explicit 
authoritative support for this claim, but it may be inferred as a reasonable consequence of 
the erga omnes nature of a norm that the State has a duty to prosecute violations.241  
 The relationship between exclusive domestic jurisdiction and international crimes 
has further been addressed by the ICTY in the Tadic case:  
“…the Trial Chamber can see no invasion into a State’s jurisdiction because, 
as it has been rightly argued on behalf of the prosecutor, they were never 
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of any individual State (emphasis 
added)…”242
According to Ingelse, this statement supports the conclusion that torture is a crime outside 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the territorial State.243 The validity of this argument can be 
questioned since Tadic was accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, not 
individual acts of torture. On the other hand, the main rationale behind the statement 
appears to be the status of the offences as international crimes. If torture has gained 
recognition as a separate international crime, as proposed by this thesis,244 the statement 
from the Tadic case supports the conclusion that the prosecution of torture is a matter 
outside the exclusive jurisdiction of individual States. 
 Furthermore, if customary international law authorizes universal jurisdiction over 
torture, this implies that prosecution of torture is a matter of international concern and 
outside the scope of the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of any State. Customary law may 
not authorize or oblige States to exercise jurisdiction over acts within the exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction of the territorial State. While the discussions in the following 
subsections primarily address the issue of whether, or to what extent States have a right or 
a duty to prosecute torture committed in other States, the existence of such a right or duty 
have implications for the applicability of the principle of non-interference. The final 
closure on the relevance of the principle of non-interference is therefore part of the 
concluding comment on the lawfulness of conditioned and absolute universal jurisdiction 
over torture.245
                                                 
240 See Boed (2000), p. 328. 
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 4.3.3 The jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture 
The question to be examined in the following is whether the jus cogens nature of the 
prohibition against torture provides every State with universal jurisdiction.246
4.3.3.1 Does jus cogens provide a discretional right to apply universal jurisdiction? 
Since every State has an interest in the fulfilment of jus cogens norms, every States would 
in principle have an interest in the prosecution of a violation. This appears as a rationale 
consequence of the jus cogens quality of a norm. Bassiouni is among those who have 
argued that the jus cogens nature of an international crime is sufficient as a basis for 
universal jurisdiction: 
“Scholars, including this writer, support the proposition that an independent 
theory of universal jurisdiction exists with respect to jus cogens international 
crimes.”247
Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressed the same opinion in the Pinochet case: 
“The jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture justifies states in 
taking universal jurisdiction. International law provides that offences jus 
cogens may be punished by any State because the offenders are “common 
enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their 
apprehension”.248
Another Law Lord in the Pinochet case, Lord Millet, suggested a related but more 
restrictive procedure on how to determine whether a crime is covered by universal 
jurisdiction or not. He maintained that there is a connection between universal jurisdiction 
and jus cogens, but argued that it is only partly and dependent upon additional 
circumstances: 
“In my opinion, crimes prohibited by international law attract universal 
jurisdiction under customary international law if two criteria are satisfied. 
First, they must be contrary to a peremptory norm of international law so as to 
infringe a jus cogens. Secondly, they must be so serious and on such a scale 
that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the international legal order. 
Isolated offences, even if committed by public officials, would not satisfy 
these criteria.”249
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 A single act of torture would not qualify as a crime covered by universal jurisdiction under 
the view of Lord Millet while it would qualify under the approach of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. Because there are several interpretations of the nature of the relationship 
between jus cogens and universal jurisdiction there is a need for authoritative support in 
order to conclude on the matter.  
While this topic not has been addressed by the ICJ, the ICTY discussed it in the 
above cited Furundzjia case. In this case the ICTY elaborated on the practical implications 
of the jus cogens character in regard to individual criminal liability: 
“The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law 
has other effects at the inter-State and individual levels. … at the individual, 
that is, that of criminal liability, it would seem that one of the consequences of 
the jus cogens character bestowed by the international community upon 
prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute 
and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a 
territory under its jurisdiction.”250
Since the formulation is clear, the Court forcefully supports the interpretation that all States 
are justified, or ‘entitled’, to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite alleged torturers 
present in their territory. The content of the described right resembles the content of the 
formula ‘aut dedere aut judicare’, which is based on conditioned universal jurisdiction. 
As the rationale for its conclusion, the Court emphasizes: 
“Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the one hand to prohibit torture to such 
an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered treaty-making power of 
sovereign States, and on the other hand bar States from prosecuting and 
punishing those torturers who have engaged in this odious practice abroad.”251
It could be argued that the treaty-making power is one aspect of the State sovereignty that 
is quite different from the competence to prosecute individuals accused of extraterritorial 
crimes. On the other hand, it is important to remember that a jus cogens norm is absolute 
and universal, and any violation, derogation or exception accordingly is regarded a serious 
violation against all mankind. On the basis of this norm, it seems reasonable that every 
State is justified in prosecuting torture unless other rules bar prosecution in a given case. 
 If the question is to be raised in front of the ICJ, which it possible may in the case 
between France and the Congo, the ICJ can challenge the view of the ICTY, but it can not 
ignore it. As an international tribunal established by the UN Security Council, the ICTY 
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 holds an important position in the international legal community. The ICTY must therefore 
be regarded as an authoritative interpreter of customary law,252 in particular in the field of 
international criminal law. The Court’s interpretation of international law at this point was 
not necessary for the outcome of the case, but even as an obiter dictum, the statement 
carries significant interest. Until then, the statement of the ICTY appears to be the most 
weighty and authoritative interpretation of customary law in regard to the right of every 
State to apply conditioned universal jurisdiction. 
Since there is no authoritative interpretation in regard to the application of absolute 
universal jurisdiction over torture, and no State practice that support such a rule, it is 
difficult to provide evidence that the jus cogens nature also permits this form of universal 
jurisdiction.  
4.3.3.2 Does jus cogens provide an obligation to apply universal jurisdiction? 
Bassiouni has further argued that one implication of recognizing an international crime as a 
jus cogens norm is that every State has a duty to prosecute or extradite alleged torturers 
present in the territory: 
“To this writer, the implications of jus cogens are those of a duty and not of 
optional rights; otherwise, jus cogens would not constitute a peremptory norm 
of international law. … Above all, the characterization of certain crimes as jus 
cogens places upon states the obligation erga omnes not to grant impunity to 
the violators of such crimes.”253
His rationale is that the duty not to grant impunity for such crimes is an obligation erga 
omnes due to the un-derogable nature of these crimes.254 Hazel Fox seems to support this 
view when she writes that an obligation aut dedere aut judicare, which is adopted in treaty 
provisions: 
“… is to be distinguished from that of universal jurisdiction which arises as a 
consequence of an erga omnes obligation to exercise jurisdiction over acts 
wherever committed in violation of certain jus cogens norms…”255
Nonetheless, when the ICTY elaborated on the effects of jus cogens¸ the ICTY 
acknowledged a right to establish and exercise conditioned universal jurisdiction, not a 
duty. If the duty had developed into a rule of customary law, either as a consequence of the 
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 jus cogens character or through demonstrated compatible behaviour and opinio juris, it 
could have been clarified by the ICTY. 
 The approach that every State has an obligation under customary law to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over torture is interesting; if it was to be recognized as customary 
law, and implemented and acted upon by all States, the enforcement of individual liability 
for international crimes would without doubt be more effective. The fight against impunity 
would be afforded considerable political importance, and all States would idealistically 
cooperate in the best interests of justice. Currently, however, the position is without 
authoritative support in international law. In the literature, even advocates of universal 
jurisdiction commonly refer to universal jurisdiction as a possible right under customary 
law, not a duty. As phrased by the former Special Rapporteur on torture, Nigel Rodley: 
“... permissive universality of jurisdiction is probably already achieved under 
general international law [emphasis added]…”256
Without further evidence it is difficult to maintain that all States have an erga omnes 
obligation to prosecute jus cogens crimes. 
4.3.4 The universal nature of the crime of torture 
The narrow link between universal jurisdiction and international crimes in modern doctrine 
and practice necessitates a discussion on whether the status of torture as an international 
crime is sufficient to establish universal jurisdiction. 
 In his Separate opinion to the Arrest warrant case, President Guillaume does not 
accept such a link. Having examined certain examples of State practice and opinio juris, he 
cites the following passage by Lord Slynn of Hadley, one of the Law Lords in the Pinochet 
case: 
“It does not seem … that it has been shown that there is any State practice or 
general consensus let alone a widely supported convention that all crimes 
against international law should be justiciable in National Courts on the basis 
of the universality of jurisdiction … The fact that an act is recognized as a 
crime under international law does not mean that the courts of all States have 
jurisdiction to try it … There is no universality of jurisdiction for crimes 
against international law…”257
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 The ICTY in the Furundzjia case bases their argumentation mainly on the jus cogens 
nature of the prohibition against torture. Simultaneously, it is evident that the Court also 
regards the universal nature of the crime as a relevant factor: 
“This legal basis for States’ universal jurisdiction over torture bears out and 
strengthens the legal foundation for such jurisdiction found by other courts in 
the inherently universal character of the crime.”258
After this passage, the ICTY cites domestic Courts that have invoked the universality of 
the crime as the main argument for universal jurisdiction.259 This signifies that the Court 
evaluate the universal nature of the crime as a supportive and complimentary argument for 
the lawfulness of conditioned universal jurisdiction.  
 The view of the ICTY has greater weight than the personal view of the ICJ’s 
President and a British Law Lord. It is still worth noticing that the opinions seem to be 
divided, and that the ICTY places a greater emphasis on the jus cogens character of the 
crime than its universal nature. Presumably, it is the combination of an international crime 
and a violation of a jus cogens norm which provides conditioned universal jurisdiction 
under current international law. 
4.3.5 The erga omnes character of the prohibition against torture 
Jus cogens norms are primarily substantive in nature while erga omnes obligations are 
procedural.260 On the basis of this observation can it be questioned whether the erga omnes 
character of a jus cogens norm is important for the establishment of universal procedural 
rights, or whether the three qualities of jus cogens, erga omnes and international crimes 
together justify universal jurisdiction. A brief examination of the relevance of erga omnes 
is thus useful. 
 The arguments of those who emphasise the importance of erga omnes are based on 
the following dictum in the Barcelona Traction case: 
“…an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former concerned all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, 
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are 
obligations erga omnes.”261
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 The relevant statement in the dictum is that “all States can be held to have a legal interest” 
in the protection of erga omnes obligation. A textual interpretation of the term ‘legal 
interest’ could suggest that it refers to, or includes, a justified right to establish jurisdiction. 
The rationale presented by Randall is more or less representative of the publicists who 
invoke the argument of erga omnes in the discussion on universal jurisdiction: 
“Violations of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms affect all states, 
whether committed by state actors or individuals. Indeed, domestic 
jurisdiction over those violations may draw support from the Barcelona 
Traction case dictum, which, though not without ambiguity, may support a 
type of actio popularis, enabling any state to vindicate rights common to all. 
If that dictum supports judicial remedies against state offenders, it logically 
also supports judicial remedies against individual offenders, thus 
complementing the universality principle. In this way, the erga omnes and jus 
cogens doctrines may buttress the universal jurisdiction of all states.”262
Further support has been founded on the argument that the Barcelona Traction dictum was 
delivered as a modification of an earlier dictum by the ICJ in the South-West Africa 
cases.263 In the South West Africa cases, Liberia and Ethiopia were denied locus standing 
in proceedings regarding South Africa’s administration of South West Africa, in particular 
in regard to South Africa’s practice of apartheid.264 According to the ICJ, international law 
did not recognize the legal standing of a State not directly involved in a case. The Court 
stated that humanitarian considerations could inspire, but not in itself entail a legal interest. 
Publicists that connect Barcelona Traction and South West Africa have inferred that the 
erga omnes statement must be read as an acceptance of every State’s legal interest in the 
fulfilment and enforcement of humanitarian standards.265
 Arguments against the relevance of erga omnes and its link to the South West 
Africa cases are related to the observation that universal jurisdiction regards the 
enforcement of individual liability and not State responsibility.266 The context of both the 
Barcelona Traction case and the South West Africa cases where both inter-State conflicts, 
where no individuals were parties to the proceedings. The fact that the ICJ did not mention 
individual liability indicates that legal standing to enforce individual liability was regarded 
as irrelevant with respect to erga omnes obligations. 
                                                 
262 See Randall (1987-1988), p. 831.  
263 See the South West Africa cases, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 34, § 50. 
264 The case is presented in more detail in Brownlie (2003), pp. 449-52. 
265 Schachter discussed the relationship between the Barcelona Traction judgment and the South West Africa 
cases in regard to inter-State conflicts, see Schachter (1991), pp. 208-13. 
266 See Reydams (2003), p. 40. 
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  The role of the State was also evident in the terminology of the ICJ, as the Court 
stressed that erga omnes obligations are owed by States towards the entire community of 
other States. An interpretation that the erga omnes nature of the prohibition against torture 
provides universal jurisdiction to enforce individual liability could therefore not be based 
on a textual interpretation of the Barcelona Traction dictum.267  
 Furthermore, in the Furundzjia case, the ICTY addressed the relevance of torture 
being an erga omnes obligation without mentioning the enforcement of individual liability. 
In the two paragraphs that address torture as an erga omnes obligation, §§ 151-52, the 
ICTY did not add any new aspects to the concept that could involve a right for States to 
investigate and prosecute individuals. In regard to the rights of the States, the Court merely 
maintained that all States “has a right to insist on fulfilment of the obligation or in any case 
to call for the breach to be discontinued”. To insist on the State’s compliance is not the 
same as enforcing individual criminal liability. The fact that the Court elaborated on the jus 
cogens effect in regard to the right to prosecute individuals, while it remained silent on the 
relevance of erga omnes, may indicate that the Court only regard jus cogens to be 
irrelevant for the question of universal jurisdiction. 
 As long as no authoritative interpreter has connected erga omnes obligations to the 
enforcement of individual liability through universal jurisdiction, it appears difficult to 
argue that such a link exists. The absence of such a statement indicates rather that the erga 
omnes character of the prohibition against torture neither is necessary nor relevant for the 
right of other States to prosecute individuals. In regard to other States, the application of 
the term ‘legal interest’ at best appears to be limited to a standing before an international 
tribunal in an inter-State dispute.268
4.3.6 CAT 
As mentioned above, CAT defines the crime of torture and places a common responsibility 
upon State Parties to investigate, prosecute and punish all acts of torture.269 State Parties 
are also under an obligation to prosecute extraterritorial crimes of torture whenever the 
offender is present in the territory and not extradited for prosecution in another State.270 
                                                 
267 See Higgins (1994), p. 57. 
268 See the Barcelona Traction case, § 91; and Schachter (1991), pp. 208-13. 
269 See articles 1, 4-8 and 12.  
270 See CAT article 5 paragraph 2 and article 7. The application of these provisions will be examined in 
chapter 5. 
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 CAT thus provides a basis in treaty law for obligatory conditioned universal jurisdiction 
over torture in regard to alleged offenders from other State Parties. 
 The interpretation of the content of this duty in regard to State Parties is analyzed in 
chapter 6. To be examined in subsection 4.3.6 is whether the adoption and recognition of 
CAT has established conditioned universal jurisdiction over torture as part of customary 
law, either in an obligatory or permissive form. 
4.3.6.1 Has the duty enshrined in CAT developed into customary law? 
Non-Party States are not bound by treaty obligations unless they explicitly give their 
consent.271 A treaty provision of a fundamental norm-creating character may still develop 
into a binding rule for Non-Party States if both State Parties and Non-Party States 
demonstrate compatible behaviour and opinio juris.272 Since CAT imposes an obligation to 
establish and exercise conditioned universal jurisdiction over alleged offenders who are not 
extradited, the natural question is whether this duty has become a rule of customary law 
through the traditional procedure of identifying State practice and opinio juris. 
 134 of the 191 UN member States are presently State Parties to CAT.273 There is 
State practice post Pinochet which signifies that certain State Parties fulfil their obligations 
under CAT, but the practice is limited. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, a Dutch 
court has convicted a Congolese national for torture committed in the Congo on the basis 
of CAT.274 France has initiated investigations in regard to alleged crimes of torture 
committed in Congo, but no one has yet been prosecuted.275 Belgium has claimed 
jurisdiction over torture committed in Chad under the rule of Habré and filed a case against 
the ex-Chadian dictator. After having examined State reports submitted to the Torture 
Committee up till 2001, Ingelse found only one reported case where a foreigner actually 
had been prosecuted for torture committed abroad against foreigners on the basis of 
CAT.276 Ingelse did not provide information on how many alleged torturers had been 
reported extradited for the purpose of prosecution. 
                                                 
271 See article 34 in the Vienna Convention. 
272 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark) (Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, p. 45. 
273 For information on ratifications of CAT as of 21 November 2003, see http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ENGLISH/bible/ englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty14.asp (visited 12.04.04).  
274 See note 19. 
275 See note 21 with accompanying text. 
276 See Ingelse (2001), p. 351, referring to CAT/C/SR. 345, § 24. 
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 In the case of Non-Party States, no practice of relevance is referred to in the 
examined literature.277 No expression of relevant opinio juris is either documented in this 
regard. The lack of reference to relevant State practice and opinio juris, especially among 
Non-Party States, is a strong indication that the obligation to establish and exercise 
conditioned universal jurisdiction under CAT has not developed into customary law.  
 The ICJ has so far not addressed this issue in any operate part of their judgments. 
As emphasised above, in the Furundzjia case, the ICTY concluded that every State is 
entitled to apply conditioned universal jurisdiction, but the Court did not maintain that 
every State has a duty to apply this jurisdiction under customary law.278  
 In his Separate opinion to the Arrest Warrant case, Guillaume seems to conclude 
that the duty has developed into a rule of customary law: 
“Whenever the perpetrator of any of the offences covered by these 
conventions is found in the territory of a State, that State is under an 
obligation to arrest him, and then extradite or prosecute. … Thus, universal 
punishment of the offences in question is assured, as the perpetrators are 
denied refuge in all States.”279
When the statement is read in its context though, Guillaume does not appear to intend this 
interpretation of the wording. He argues that customary law traditionally only has 
recognized one case of universal jurisdiction, namely that of piracy,280 and that treaty law 
provides “compulsory, albeit subsidiary universal jurisdiction” for several crimes.281 
Guillaume himself does not elaborate further on the issue and its weight is in any case 
limited without any support in more authoritative sources.  
 No other evidence has been found in support of a customary duty to apply 
conditioned universal jurisdiction over an alleged torturer who is not extradited. 
4.3.6.2 Has CAT lead to a permissive rule under customary law? 
The next question then becomes whether the adoption of CAT by the UN General 
Assembly, and the recognition of CAT by 134 States Parties, has made conditioned 
universal jurisdiction a right under customary law.  
 The status of customary law in regard to universal jurisdiction over torture was 
uncertain at the time of the adoption of CAT. Certain States, such as the USA, argued that 
                                                 
277 See Ingelse (2001); Reydams (2003); and Cassese (2003). 
278 The Furundzjia case § 156. 
279 See the Separate opinion of President Guillaume, § 9. 
280 Ibid., § 5. 
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 torture was an enemy of all mankind and could be prosecuted anywhere in the same way as 
piracy. Other States, such as France, Australia and the UK, long opposed the provision on 
universal jurisdiction.282 Nonetheless, the establishment and recognition of CAT by the 
State Members of the UN illustrated that the international community of States had a 
common interest in ensuring investigation and prosecution of torture. CAT further 
signified that the enforcement of individual liability should be a matter of international 
concern, independent of where torture had been committed or the nationality of the 
offender or the victim. 
 Randall finds the adoption of CAT and similar suppression conventions relevant for 
the existence of a customary right to apply universal jurisdiction over the crimes addressed 
in the conventions: 
“While Parties are obliged to prosecute or extradite such offenders, nonParties 
have the right to prosecute those offenders. This view gains force from the 
adoption or approval of these conventions by consensus or with few 
dissenting votes by the representative international organizations…”283
Further support for this viewpoint may be inferred from the following statement by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, the senior judge in the Pinochet case: 
“Not until there was some form of universal jurisdiction for punishment of the 
crime of torture could it really be talked about as a fully constituted 
international crime. What CAT did provide was missing: a worldwide 
universal jurisdiction.”284
Boulesbaa, on the other hand, interprets CAT to be irrelevant for the rights of Non-Party 
States under international law: 
“The multi-State jurisdiction in the Torture Convention merely connotes ‘a 
multiplicity of jurisdictions’ limited to State Parties of the Torture 
Convention”.285
Indirect support for this conclusion can perhaps be drawn from the ICTY’s argumentation 
in the Furundzjia case. Instead of arguing that the relevant obligations in CAT had 
developed into customary law, the Court maintained that every State had permission to 
prosecute on the basis that the prohibition against torture had acquired the status of a jus 
                                                                                                                                                    
281 Ibid., § 7. 
282 See UN.Doc E/CN. 4/1314 (1978) for a summary of the comments received from Governments on the 
first Draft Articles of the Convention. See also Boulesbaa (1999), pp. 204-5. 
283 See Randall (1987-88), p. 826. 
284 See the opinion of Lord-Browne-Wilkinson, note 88, p. 21. 
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 cogens norm. This indicates that the Court found it more valid to base conditioned 
universal jurisdiction upon the recognition of torture a jus cogens rule than the 
establishment and adoption of CAT.  
 On the basis of this material it appears difficult to conclude on the relevance of 
CAT for the establishment of a customary permissive rule on conditioned universal 
jurisdiction over torture. There is little doubt, however, that the existence of CAT is 
important as a political justification for such jurisdiction. In an evaluation of whether 
customary law recognizes conditioned universal jurisdiction or not, CAT would surely be 
included as a relevant argument in support of such a rule. 
4.3.7 Concluding observations on conditioned universal jurisdiction 
4.3.7.1 Conclusion under the main rule 
According to the main rule proposed by the PCIJ, States have conditioned universal 
jurisdiction on the basis of their own sovereignty. The only limitation is that the exercise of 
conditioned universal jurisdiction must not violate other rules of international law. Of 
importance in this regard are especially 1) the prohibition against exercise of jurisdiction 
outside the territory of the legislating State, 2) the principle of non-interference in the 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of other States and 3) other rules which may bar 
prosecution in a given case, e.g. a valid claim of immunity.  
While immunity rules are left outside the scope of the thesis, none of the other rules 
have been found to prohibit conditioned universal jurisdiction over torture. Conditioned 
universal jurisdiction is enforced within the State’s own territory, and the prosecution does 
not interfere in the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the territorial State. If the territorial 
State is not a State Party to neither CAT, the Inter-American Convention, the ICCPR, the 
ACHR nor the ECHR, the jus cogens character of the prohibition against torture, together 
with its erga omnes nature and the recognition of torture as an international crime, 
provides sufficient evidence that the right to prosecute torturers is not an exclusive internal 
affair under customary law. 
4.3.7.2 Conclusion under the alternative rule 
Under the alternative rule, States must prove that they have conditioned universal 
jurisdiction according to an explicit rule of international law. Furthermore, States must 
                                                                                                                                                    
285 See Boulesbaa (1999), p. 205. 
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 ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate any other international rules of 
relevance. The prohibitive rules mentioned in regard to the main rule are equally important 
under this approach.  
In the case of torture, the recognition of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition 
against torture, the recognition of torture as an international crime and the adoption and 
wide recognition of CAT, are all relevant arguments in favour of an international 
customary rule providing conditioned universal jurisdiction. This conclusion is supported 
by the ICTY, as well as by individual judges of the British House of Lords and a number 
of acknowledged publicists on international criminal law. It is nonetheless difficult to 
determine when such a customary rule emerged. This study will therefore only conclude 
that customary law at present provides conditioned universal jurisdiction over torture. If 
conditioned universal jurisdiction is exercised in regard to torture committed at an earlier 
point in time, the temporal scope of the customary rule may be of relevance.286
4.3.8 Concluding observations on absolute universal jurisdiction 
4.3.8.1 Conclusion under the main rule 
Under main rule, absolute universal jurisdiction is just as lawful as conditioned universal 
jurisdiction. The principle of non-interference does not apply differently than in the case of 
conditioned universal jurisdiction since the jurisdiction only can be enforced within the 
territory of the legislating State. In order to exercise this jurisdiction, the State must also in 
this case ensure that no prohibitive rules are violated. The question of whether or when 
absolute universal jurisdiction should be applied is a separate question, which will be 
elaborated on in subsection 6.3. 
4.3.8.2  Conclusion under the alternative rule 
Under the alternative rule, absolute universal jurisdiction also needs an explicit basis in 
customary law in order to be lawful. Significantly, though, a customary rule on absolute 
universal jurisdiction over torture is not supported by authoritative evidence. No 
international tribunals have explicitly addressed the issue. Some domestic legal systems 
have adopted the principle, but domestic legal courts have not relied upon this jurisdiction 
without some additional jurisdictional principles, in most cases the passive personality 
                                                 
286 The relevance of the temporal scope of conditioned universal jurisdiction under CAT is examined in 
subsection 5.2.2. 
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 principle. This is well illustrated by the Pinochet case and the Eichman case. Furthermore, 
in the Furundzjia case, the ICTY linked the right to prosecute torture to the presence of the 
alleged offender. This leads to the conclusion that absolute jurisdiction over torture under 
the alternative rule is unlawful under current international law, unless the territorial State 
itself requires or gives consent to its application. 
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5 Universal jurisdiction over torture under CAT 
5.1 The duty under CAT to establish conditioned universal jurisdiction 
Having examined universal jurisdiction over torture under customary law, the focus of 
study turns now to treaty law. The present chapter will analyse the application of 
conditioned universal jurisdiction over torture under CAT. 
5.1.1 Introduction to the text of article 5 paragraph 2 
CAT addresses the establishment of jurisdiction in its article 5: 
“1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish 
its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:  
a. When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or 
on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
b. When the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
c. When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it 
appropriate. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged 
offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not 
extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 
1 of this article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with internal law.”287
With the words “Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction” in paragraph 1 and 2, the article stipulates a positive obligation 
for State Parties to establish jurisdiction. The offences referred to in article 4, for which 
jurisdiction shall be established, are “all acts of torture”, including “attempt[s] to commit 
torture” and acts “which constitutes complicity or participation in torture”.288
                                                 
287 The formulation in article 5, especially paragraph 2 and 3, resembles that which appears in other 
international suppression conventions, see Bassiouni and Wise (1995). 
288 See the Annex for the full text of CAT article 4. 
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  Jurisdiction is to be established in four different situations. These situations reflect 
different principles of criminal jurisdiction.289 The jurisdiction in paragraph 1 litra a is 
based on the territorial principle; jurisdiction shall be established over all acts committed 
within the territory of the State. The jurisdiction in paragraph 1 litra b is based on the 
active nationality principle; jurisdiction shall be established over all acts committed by 
nationals of the State, independent of where they have been committed. The jurisdiction in 
paragraph 1 litra c is based on the passive nationality principle; jurisdiction may be 
established over all acts committed against nationals of the State, independent of where 
they have been committed. The jurisdiction in paragraph 2 is based on the conditioned 
universality principle and linked to the duty to extradite or prosecute;290 jurisdiction shall 
be established over alleged torturers who are present in their territory and not extradited. 
No other nexus is required than the voluntary presence of an alleged offender. 
 Article 5 paragraph 3 stresses that CAT does not limit the right of the State Parties 
to exercise wider criminal jurisdiction in accordance with internal law. The right to 
establish and exercise e.g. absolute universal jurisdiction is accordingly regulated by 
customary law, not CAT.291  
 Of relevance for the discussion of article 5 is only paragraph 2, which provides 
conditioned universal jurisdiction over torture. While some commentators reject the use of 
the term universal jurisdiction in regard to treaty provisions linked to the formula aut 
dedere aut judicare,292 others apply it as a matter of course.293 Since the main 
characteristics are equal, the present thesis uses the term ‘conditioned universal 
jurisdiction’ in regard to both customary and treaty law. 
                                                 
289 For a thorough elaboration and comparison of the different forms of criminal extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
see e.g. Reydams (2003), pp. 21-4, Cassese (2003), pp. 277-91, Shaw (2003), pp. 579-610, and Bassiouni, 
“Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice” (2001-
2002), p. 90, note 34. 
290 In latin aut dedere aut judicare. See chapter 3, section 3.3 above for an introduction to the development of 
this duty. See section 5.2 below for an analysis of this duty under CAT. 
291 The status of customary law in regard to absolute universal jurisdiction is discussed in chapter 4, with 
conclusion in subsection 4.3.7. 
292 See e.g. Boulesbaa (1999), pp. 204-5, preferring the term ‘multi-State jurisdiction’. 
293 See e.g. Cassese, note 40. 
 73 
 5.1.2 The scope in regard to the nationality of the alleged offender 
Treaties are only binding on State Parties, or third States which have consented thereto.294 
A ‘law-making’ treaty may nonetheless create general norms with universal application, as 
long as treaty provisions do not violate rights of third States under customary law.295
 Since the object of CAT is to strengthen the universal recognition and enforcement 
of the prohibition against torture,296 a reasonable question is whether CAT addresses 
torture committed by nationals of all States, or only torture committed by nationals of State 
Parties. This question is practical both in regard to the interpretation of CAT article 5 
paragraph 2 and article 7, but its exploration appears most natural under the heading of 
article 5.297
5.1.2.1 The text, context and purpose of article 5 paragraph 2 
According to the main rule on treaty interpretation, article 31 of the Vienna Convention, 
treaties shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the treaty. These terms shall be read in their context and in the light of the object 
and purpose of the treaty.298 To be examined in this section is the text of article 5 
paragraph 2, its context in CAT and the purpose of CAT. 
 The obligation in article 5 paragraph 2 is formulated as a duty for the custodial 
State to “establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to 
article 8 to any of the States mentioned in article 1”.299 According to the text, there are two 
cumulative criteria which determine the scope of the duty to establish jurisdiction. The first 
criterion is that an alleged offender has to be present within the territory of a State Party. 
The second criterion is that the alleged offender is not extradited pursuant to article 8 to 
any State having jurisdiction under paragraph 1. If these two criteria are fulfilled, there is 
no alternative for the State Party but to establish jurisdiction over the alleged torturer. 
                                                 
294 See article 34 of the Vienna Convention. 
295 As opposed to ‘treaty-contracts’, which only applies to a limited number of State Parties. The distinction 
is practical rather than formal, see Shaw (2003), pp.88-9. 
296 See Burgers and Danelius, A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1988), pp. 1 and 131; and Inglese (2001), p. 318. 
297 The duty to exercise jurisdiction in article 7 refers to the situations prescribed in article 5. The text of 
article 7 is presented in subsection 5.2.1. 
298 Included in the context are also any subsequent agreements on interpretation, any subsequent practice that 
establishes an agreement of the State Parties, and any customary rules applicable in the relations between the 
Parties, see article 31 paragraph 2. None of these sources are referred to in the scholarly treatment of article 5 
paragraph 2. The following literature has been examined: Burgers and Danelius (1988); Boulesbaa (1999); 
and Ingelse (2001). 
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  Difficulties arise in conjunction with the second cumulative criterion, which is 
fulfilled if the alleged perpetrator is not extradited under article 8 to any State having 
jurisdiction under paragraph 1. As article 8 only regulates extradition between State 
Parties, the custodial State could not extradite an alleged torturer to a Non-Party State 
pursuant to article 8.300 Because the scope of the extradition alternative in article 5 
paragraph 2 in practice is limited to nationals of State Parties, the question is whether this 
aspect of the criterion also limits the scope of the first criterion. 
 While paragraph 2 is formulated as a duty either to establish jurisdiction or 
extradite, with no other alternative, a textual interpretation suggests that all alleged 
torturers present in the territory either should be extradited or covered by the jurisdiction. 
This interpretation is also supported by the ordinary meaning of the term “the alleged 
offender”, which is not linked to any nationality requirement in article 5 paragraph 2. The 
absence of such a requirement is different from article 5 paragraph 1 litra b and c, where 
the issue of nationality is specifically addressed. Even thought the reference to article 8 
limits the scope of the second criterion, the formulation of the first criterion and its context 
in article 5 does not suggest that it also restricts the scope of alleged offenders covered by 
the first criterion. 
 It is important to note that CAT may not effect the application of existing 
extradition agreements between State Parties and Non-Party States.301 Although nationals 
of Non-Party States cannot be extradited on the basis of article 8, the custodial State may 
have a primary obligation to extradite these individuals on the basis of multilateral or 
bilateral extradition agreements independent of CAT. The text of article 5 paragraph 2 does 
therefore not limit the extradition alternative to nationals of State Parties.  
 The sole consequence of limiting the scope of the second criterion to article 8 
would be that the custodial State Party has a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction 
over all alleged torturers who can not be extradited to a State Party pursuant to article 8 
with jurisdiction according to paragraph 1. 
                                                                                                                                                    
299 The term “such offences” refers to all cases of torture, as defined in article 4. 
300 If follows from article 8 paragraph 1 that State Parties to CAT have to include torture as an extraditable 
offence in any extradition agreement between them. According to paragraph 2, CAT shall serve as an 
extradition treaty if there is no such treaty between two State Parties and the custodial State requires a treaty 
basis for extradition. States that do not require an extradition agreement shall also recognize torture as 
extraditable offences in relation to others State Parties according to paragraph 3. Under paragraph 4, for the 
purpose of extradition between State Parties, all acts of torture shall be considered as if they had been 
committed also within the territory of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with 
article 5 paragraph 1.  
301 See article 34 of the Vienna Convention. 
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  The interpretation that alleged torturers of all nationalities are covered by article 5 
paragraph 2 is further supported by the objective of the Convention to create an effective 
system for the enforcement of the prohibition against torture.302As stated in its preamble, 
CAT was created based on a desire “to make more effective the struggle against torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world”. The 
formulation embeds a clear ambition to fight torture and torturers on a universal basis. If 
article 5 paragraph 2 was to be interpreted to only impose a duty to establish jurisdiction 
over nationals of State Parties, the effectiveness of the Convention would be drastically 
reduced. Only if the article is applicable to all alleged torturers can the Convention prevent 
the territories of State Parties from becoming safe havens for torturers. Hence, the 
objective and purpose of the Convention support an interpretation which includes all 
nationalities.303
5.1.2.2 Interpretations of publicists 
Ingelse proposes that the aim of CAT apparently includes nationals of Non-Party States , 
while the reference to article 8 suggests that they are not.304 On this basis he is hesitant to 
conclude that a State Party which fails to establish an extensive universal jurisdiction is in 
breach of a Convention obligation.305 Instead he recommends that the Torture Committee 
should encourage State Parties to voluntarily include nationals of Non-Party States .306 
This conclusion may seem reasonable, but only if one agrees that the textual interpretation 
clearly supports his conclusion. 
 Burgers and Danelius, on the other hand, do not explicitly discuss whether there 
may be any limitations to the duty to establish jurisdiction: 
“Paragraph 2 provides that, whether or not any of the grounds of jurisdiction 
dealt with in paragraph 1 exist, a State Party shall have jurisdiction over 
offences of torture in all cases where the alleged offender is present in a 
territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him to a State which 
has jurisdiction under paragraph 1 (emphasis added). In view of paragraph 2, 
the Convention can be said to be based on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction (emphasis added).”307  
                                                 
302 See Inglese (2001), p. 318; and Burgers and Danelius (1988), p. 131. 
303 The preparatory work of CAT does not address the issue, see Ingelse (2001), p. 322.  
304 See Ingelse (2001), pp. 322-3. 
305 Ibid, p. 323. 
306 See Ingelse (2001), p. 327. 
307 See Burger and Danelius (1988), pp. 132-3. 
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 Since Burgers and Danelius are silent on the issue, interpretations of their comment may 
turn into speculations. It might be argued that the term “all cases” in combination with the 
term “universal jurisdiction” support the conclusion that alleged torturers from all States 
are included in the scope. However, even though they stress that the jurisdiction in article 5 
paragraph 2 is based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, this do not have to mean that 
the jurisdiction necessarily also covers nationals of Non-Party States . The legal relevance 
of their comment is therefore limited in this respect. 
5.1.2.3 State practice 
As Ingelse interprets the formulation of article 5 paragraph 2 to exclude nationals of Non-
Party States , practice concerning its implementation is of some interest. Albeit State 
practice does not necessarily signify opinio juris, it illustrates how State Parties have 
chosen to fulfil their treaty obligation. 
 Reydams has examined the ambit of the criminal law of 14 States in regard to 
universal jurisdiction, which were all State Parties to CAT.308 The countries examined 
were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, the 
Netherlands, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, The United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. The examination shows that none of the States had limited their provisions on 
conditioned or absolute universal jurisdiction to nationals of State Parties.309 Four of the 
States had established conditioned universal jurisdiction over all alleged torturers present 
in their territories through a special act implementing CAT.310 Nine of the States had 
established general clauses that endow their municipal courts with universal jurisdiction in 
accordance with their treaty obligations.311  
 As laid out in the argumentation above, it is not clear whether this State practice is 
the result of a perceived duty or practical considerations. Therefore, the implementation of 
article 5 paragraph 2 by individual State Parties has no critical significance for the 
determination of its scope. Still, it is worth noting that 13 of the 14 States which had 
                                                 
308 See Reydams (2003). 
309 For his conclusion on this matter, see Reydams (2003), p. 220. 
310 Examples referred to in Reydams (2003) are Australia, p. 89; The Netherlands, pp. 167-9; The UK, pp. 
203-4 and note 40, pp. 208-9; and the USA, p. 215. 
311 Examples referred to in Reydams (2003) are Austria, pp. 94 and 97; Denmark, pp. 127-6; France, pp. 132-
3; Belgium, p. 105; Canada, p. 119; Germany, pp. 142-3; Israel, p. 159; Spain, p. 183; and Switzerland, p. 
194. 
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 established universal jurisdiction had established a general jurisdiction rather than a 
jurisdiction limited to nationals of State Parties to treaties.312
5.1.2.4 No treaty obligation may modify sovereign rights of third States 
The final issue to be examined with respect to the scope of article 5 paragraph 2 is whether 
a duty to include nationals of Non-Party States  infringes sovereign rights of third States. If 
this is the case, the scope of the duty must be limited to nationals of State Parties 
independent of the text and object of CAT. 
 Illustrative of this problem is the dispute between the US and State Parties to the 
ICC treaty, concerning the right of the State Parties to use the authority of the Rome 
Statute to prosecute nationals of Non-Party States , such as the US. The US has argued that 
the wording of the ICC treaty constitute a violation of the sovereign right of the US to 
oppose new treaty obligations and reject any binding effect of an emerging customary rule 
through persistent objections.313 This argument may be questioned, in particular since all 
States are understood to have conditioned universal jurisdiction under customary law over 
the crimes covered by the ICC Statute.314 Still, the case is interesting as it suggests that 
non-State Parties to CAT may reject the conditioned universal jurisdiction of State Parties 
on the same basis. 
 A question of more abstract nature, which arises in conjunction with CAT, is 
whether rights of Non-Party States should be examined in regard to the duty to exercise 
jurisdiction under article 7. As demonstrated by State practice, extraterritorial legislative 
jurisdiction is seldom a matter of international concern before it is enforced.315  
In the case of CAT, the scope of the duty to establish jurisdiction is closely related 
to the scope of the duty to exercise jurisdiction. According to article 7 paragraph 1, State 
Parties have a duty to extradite or prosecute alleged torturers “in the cases contemplated in 
article 5”. Since CAT presumes that the situations covered by article 5 and article 7 in 
general are the same, it appears useful to examine the relevance of third States rights with 
respect to article 5. This discussion has then implications also for the scope of the duty to 
                                                 
312 At the time of Reydams examination, Senegal had not yet established any form of universal jurisdiction in 
its domestic law, see Reydams (2003) p. 180. 
313 The US invoked arguments from the ICJ in the Fisheries case (UK v. Norway) as support for their dissent, 
see ICJ Reports 1951, p. 131. 
314 See Scharft, “The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States” (2000), pp. 213-37. 
315 The observation is also made by Schachter (1991), p. 257; and Reydams (2003), p. 25. 
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 exercise jurisdiction under article 7, even though the exercise of jurisdiction may be further 
limited, e.g. by a temporal limitation or a valid claim of immunity.316
 The fundamental rule concerning the relationship between treaty obligations and 
third States rights is codified in article 34 of the Vienna Convention. According to this 
rule, no treaty obligation may create a right or obligation for third States without their 
consent. In its commentary to the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission 
acknowledged, referring to the practice of international tribunals, that also modifications of 
rights in principle require the consent of third States: 
“International tribunals have been firm in laying down that in principle 
treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither impose obligations on States 
which are not Parties nor modify in any way their legal rights without their 
consent (emphasis added).”317
In view of the fact that neither the establishment nor the exercise of jurisdiction may create 
rights or obligations for third States, the relevant question is whether the establishment and 
later exercise of conditioned universal jurisdiction modifies an exclusive right of third 
States to prosecute their own nationals. 
 The problem of whether States originally has an exclusive right to prosecute torture 
is related to the discussion on whether the matter is within the exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction of the territorial State. It is further related to the question of whether other 
States have conditioned universal jurisdiction under customary law. If both questions are 
answered affirmatively, a duty to establish, and later exercise, conditioned universal 
jurisdiction would not violate third State rights. If all States have conditioned universal 
jurisdiction over torture under customary law, a treaty rule transforming this right into a 
duty would not modify any rights of third States. 
 As concluded in chapter 4, the prosecution of torture does not appear as a matter 
exclusively regulated by internal law or treaty provisions.318 This study has also concluded 
that conditioned universal jurisdiction is lawful under customary law, both in regard to the 
main rule and the alternative rule presented by the PCIJ in the Lotus judgement.319 The 
different aspects of the international recognition of the prohibition against torture, and 
relevant interpretations of the legal effect of this recognition by both authoritative and less 
                                                 
316 See section 5.2 in regard to the temporal question. 
317 See the Report of the International Law Commission, published in Watts, International Law Commission 
1949-1998, Vol. II, p. 698. 
318 See subsections 4.3.2 and 4.3.7. 
319 See subsection 4.3.7. 
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 authoritative sources, provide substantial support for these two conclusions.320 Thus, under 
current international law, article 34 of the Vienna Convention does not constitute an 
obstacle for the inclusion of nationals of Non-Party States  in the scope of article 5 and 7. 
5.1.2.5 Conclusion 
The wording of article 5 paragraph 2, as interpreted in subsection 5.1.2.1, suggests that no 
alleged offender is excluded from the scope of jurisdiction under article 5 paragraph 2. The 
object of CAT and the State practice referred to above supports this solution. State Parties 
to CAT are thus under an obligation to establish conditioned universal jurisdiction over all 
alleged torturers present in their territory who are not extradited to State Parties. The 
decision whether to extradite or prosecute nationals of Non-Party States  is then to be 
decided by the competent authorities under article 7. 
5.2 The duty under CAT to exercise conditioned universal jurisdiction 
5.2.1 Introduction to the text of article 7 
As mentioned above, CAT addresses the enforcement of jurisdiction in its article 7. Under 
this provision, State Parties are under a duty to exercise conditioned universal jurisdiction 
through the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. Article 7 reads in full text:  
“The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to 
have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases 
contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 
These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of 
any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the 
cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required 
for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those 
which apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1. 
Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any 
of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all 
stages of the proceedings.”321
In paragraph 1 a, the article formulates a positive obligation upon State Parties to enforce 
conditioned universal jurisdiction over alleged torturers present in their territory who are 
not extradited. The situations in which jurisdiction shall be enforced is “the cases 
                                                 
320 See subsections 4.3.3-4.3.6. 
321 The formulation in article 7 is similar to that which appears in other suppression conventions, see 
Bassiouni and Wise (1995). 
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 contemplated in article 5”. Even though the scope of the duty to establish jurisdiction 
under article 5 determines the outer limits for the scope of the duty to exercise 
jurisdiction,322 the duty to exercise jurisdiction may be further limited by other factors. To 
be examined here are three issues of special importance for the duty to exercise jurisdiction 
in individual cases: 1) the temporal scope of the duty, 2) the interrelationship between the 
duty to extradite and the duty to prosecute and 3) the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.323
5.2.2 The temporal scope of article 7 
The time of the crime may be of relevance for the scope of the duty to exercise jurisdiction. 
As it is customary to decide the temporal scope in regard to exercise of jurisdiction, rather 
than the establishment of jurisdiction, this aspect of CAT is discussed in regard to article 7. 
This is e.g. the common procedure in regard to criminal provisions in domestic law. In 
spite of the fundamental prohibition against non-retroactivity of substantial criminal 
provisions, such provisions do not themselves spell out their temporal scope, neither in 
domestic law nor in the statutes of international criminal tribunals. They are nonetheless 
applied from the time each provision entered into force. 
5.2.2.1 The relevance of article 34 of the Vienna Convention 
As concluded with respect to article 5 paragraph 2, article 34 of the Vienna Convention 
does not limit the scope of the duty to establish conditioned universal jurisdiction. The 
rationale leading to this conclusion is that conditioned universal jurisdiction over torture 
today must be recognized as customary international law.324 The scope of the duty to 
exercise conditioned universal jurisdiction is in addition dependent on the status of 
customary law at the time of commission of a given crime. Unless the territorial State at 
that time had ratified CAT or later consents to the jurisdiction of the custodial State, the 
status of customary law decides whether the exercise is a violation of article 34 or not. The 
result of the examination of customary law may depend on whether the main rule or the 
alternative rule proposed by the PCIJ in Lotus applied at the time of the crime.325
                                                 
322 See the discussion in subsection 5.1.2. 
323 Claims related to immunity and domestic amnesties may also be of relevance. 
324 See chapter 4, with conclusion in subsection 4.3.7. 
325 See content of the different rules are explored in section 4.2. 
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 5.2.2.2 Non-retroactivity of treaties under article 28 of the Vienna Convention  
According to customary law, as codified in article 28 of the Vienna Convention, no treaty 
is to be given retroactive effect unless otherwise decided by the Parties. The rule is linked 
to the sovereignty of the State, in the sense that State Parties themselves decide the 
temporal scope of a treaty obligation. According to the formulation in article 28: 
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a Party in relation to any act or fact 
which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the 
entry into force of the treaty with respect to that Party.” 
CAT article 27 regulates the entry into force of CAT. The article does not address the issue 
of whether CAT binds State Parties in regard to torture committed prior to the entry into 
force of CAT in regard to the individual State Party. No other part of CAT addresses this 
issue either. In this situation, the main rule contained in article 28 applies. 
 According to the wording of article 28, State Parties to CAT are under no 
obligation to exercise jurisdiction over torture committed before they themselves become 
State Parties to CAT. An act of torture constitutes an “act or fact” in the terminology of 
article 28, and State Parties would only have a duty to extradite or submit for prosecution 
individuals accused of torture committed after CAT entered into force with respect to the 
custodial State Parties. 
 This conclusion is coherent with CAT article 4, under which a State Party must 
criminalize all acts of torture, and CAT article 5, under which a State Party must establish 
the necessary jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts of torture. Only from the date a State is 
bound by CAT can the State be expected to have criminalized and established jurisdiction 
over torture in accordance with CAT. Hence, only from this point in time is it reasonable to 
require State Parties to react upon crimes of torture committed abroad amongst foreigners. 
The rationale behind prosecution or extradition would fail if the extraterritorial crime was 
not covered by domestic law of the custodial State at the time it was committed. 
The status of domestic law may further influence the application of the temporal 
scope of article 7. Even though lacking domestic legislation is unacceptable as an excuse 
for non-fulfilment of international treaty obligations,326 domestic courts could reject to 
exercise jurisdiction which did not exist at the time of the crime.327
                                                 
326 See article 27 of the Vienna Convention. 
327 The relevance of domestic criminalization of extraterritorial acts of torture was emphasized in the 
Pinochet case, see e.g. the opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead, note 88, p. 60. 
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 None of the scholars in the examined literature have addressed the application of 
non-retroactivity in regard to article 7. The House of Lords addressed the temporal 
question in the Pinochet case, but the discussion was mainly related to the requirement of 
double criminality under British law. The wording of article 28 and the context of CAT 
provides nonetheless solid support for the conclusion that the temporal scope of article 7 is 
limited to acts of torture committed after the custodial State became bound by CAT.  
5.2.2.3 The principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction must not violate the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege.328 If torture neither was criminalized in the territorial State, nor recognized as an 
international crime when the act was committed, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
constitutes a bar against prosecution. On the other hand, if the crime of torture was 
recognized as a crime under international law at the time of the crime, the domestic law of 
the territorial State is irrelevant. The principle of nullum crimen sine lege would not 
constitute a bar against prosecution, even if the territorial State had not criminalized torture 
at the time of the crime. 
5.2.2.4 Conclusion 
The temporal scope of article 7 is thus restricted by three cumulative conditions. The first 
condition is that torture has been committed after CAT became binding upon the custodial 
State. The second condition is that the territorial State had ratified CAT at the time of the 
crime, or alternatively that the exercise of jurisdiction was lawful under customary law at 
the time of the crime. The third condition is that the territorial State had criminalized 
torture at the time of the crime, or that the crime of torture was recognised as an 
international crime at the time it was committed. The temporal scope of article 7 does of 
course not limit the right to exercise conditioned universal jurisdiction over torture under 
customary law.  
5.2.3 Is the duty to prosecute subsidiary to the duty to extradite? 
The territoriality of criminal law is fundamental. There can be no doubt that the domestic 
penal codes of each State is adopted primarily with the objective to prescribe and punish 
criminal conduct occurring within the State’s own territory. State practice also signifies 
that territorial prosecution by far is the most common form of criminal enforcement. 
                                                 
328 The principle is presented and debated in regard to torture in section 2.7. 
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 Accordingly, in most cases it will be in the interest of both the territorial State and the 
custodial State that prosecution takes place in the territorial State.  
 Nevertheless, situations where the custodial State regards the territorial State as 
unable or unwilling to conduct a fair trial may still arise. The impression of such inability 
or unwillingness could be based on reports of e.g. an inadequate judicial system or an 
unstable and dangerous political situation. In these circumstances, the question arises 
whether the custodial State has discretion to reject a claim for extradition from the 
territorial State and submit the case to its own prosecutorial authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution. If the custodial State has the right to reject an extradition claim on this basis, 
the duty to extradite or prosecute is ‘alternative’ in nature. If the custodial State in every 
case has to comply with an extradition request from the territorial State, or another State 
with jurisdiction under article 5 paragraph 1, the duty to submit the case for prosecution is 
‘subsidiary’ to the duty to extradite. 
 Before examining the interrelationship between the duty to extradite and submit for 
prosecution, it is important to remember the supremacy of extradition agreements. In the 
event of the existence of a valid extradition agreement between the custodial State and the 
territorial State, the custodial State has a duty to extradite in accordance with the 
agreement. Such treaty obligations are not altered or modified by CAT.329 The in the 
following investigation is accordingly only relevant for situations not covered by a binding 
extradition agreement between the States involved. 
5.2.3.1 The text, context and purpose of article 7 
According to the wording of article 7 paragraph 1, every State Party has a duty to either 
extradite or submit for prosecution alleged offenders present in their territory. There is no 
supremacy for extradition over prosecution according to the text. The text itself provides 
therefore clear support for the conclusion that the duty to submit for prosecution is 
alternative rather than subsidiary to the duty to extradite.  
 The same conclusion may be drawn from article 5, upon which jurisdiction is 
established. This article creates a system where several States have concurrent and 
competing jurisdiction over the same act of torture, but does not deal with the issue of 
priority. Thus, in principle each State with jurisdiction under article 5 has an equal right to 
prosecute if the State obtains custody of an alleged torturer. 
                                                 
329 See article 34 of the Vienna Convention. 
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  One of the basic aims of CAT is further to contribute to the enforcement of 
individual liability for torture through fair criminal proceedings. Could this be achieved in 
the territorial State, compliance with an extradition claim would appear as the preferred 
solution for all Parties involved. The availability of evidence and witnesses would 
improve, and the general deterrent effect would be stronger in the community where the 
crime was committed. The victims would have greater possibility to take part in the 
process of legal enforcement, if they had a wish or an ambition to do so. Conversely, if a 
military dictatorship has replaced a rule of law, or if substantial evidence suggests that 
non-legal considerations will determine the decision to prosecute and the judgement itself, 
prosecution in the custodial State would be preferred. Under such circumstances, the object 
of CAT will only be realized through prosecution in the custodial State. 
 The text and aim of CAT suggests therefore that State Parties have freedom to 
evaluate and choose the most appropriate alternative in each given case. Extradition would 
only be preferable if the territorial State, or alternatively another State with a close nexus to 
the crime, was both willing and capable of conducting a fair trial. 
5.2.3.2 Interpretations of publicists 
The only publicist examined who comments in some detail on the issue is Boulesbaa. He is 
of the opinion that the duty to prosecute is subsidiary to the duty to extradite on the basis of 
two grounds; a principle of reasonableness and the principle of non-interference in the 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the State.330 The relevance of the two grounds he 
invokes in support of his argument will be discussed separately below. 
 The principle of reasonableness is adopted in the Restatement and formulated in the 
following manner: 
“When it would be not unreasonable for each of two states to exercise 
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescription by the two states are 
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other 
state’s interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors”.331
Among the relevant factors enumerated are: the link to territory, other connections between 
the State and the act, the importance of jurisdiction, the existence of justified expectations 
and the traditions of the international system. The list is not exhaustive.332 When all 
                                                 
330 See Bulesbaa (1999), p 179 and p. 235. The relevance of the principle of non-interference in regard to 
customary law was examined in chapter 4, see subsections 4.3.2 and 4.3.7. 
331 See the Restatement, section 403 (3). 
332 Ibid, section 403 (2). 
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 relevant factors are evaluated, a State should “defer to the other state if that state’s interest 
is clearly greater”.333
 The matter to be examined here is whether the principle applies to extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction under customary international law. The principle has been developed 
by US courts in the field of private international law and anti-trust litigation, which is not a 
part of public international law. While this principle has proved convenient in relation to 
the so-called “effect” doctrine, where a State may assume jurisdiction over a commercial 
act which has produced effects within its own territory, it is not evident that the principle 
applies to the exercise of jurisdiction under CAT. 
 The Restatement suggests that the principle of reasonableness has been recognized 
as a general principle of customary law.334 However, this interpretation is not supported by 
international authoritative sources. The customary status of the principle is also a topic of 
debate within American legal academia. An illustration is Schachter’s citation of a US 
Federal Judge in disagreement with the Restatement on this issue: 
“International law does not require a court (or government) to override a less 
reasonable assertion as long as both are in fact consistent with the limitations 
on jurisdiction imposed by international law.”335
Moreover, the main argument de lege ferenda against the principle is interesting, as it is 
argued that the balancing of interests creates substantial difficulties and that it should be 
treated as a rule of comity rather than a requirement of law.336  
 Had a principle of reasonableness applied to article 7, the State with the greatest 
interest would prevail in a conflict of jurisdictions. The custodial State would be under an 
unconditional obligation to comply with a claim of extradition based on CAT article 5 
paragraph 1.337 Such an interpretation does not fit well with the wording of article 7 and 
would require a solid basis in customary law to prevail over an interpretation based on the 
text. The lack of evidence of consistent State practice and opinio juris supports the 
                                                 
333 Ibid, section 403 (3). 
334 See the Restatement, Section 403, Comment a. 
335 See Schachter (1999), pp 260-1, referring to Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena et.al., 731 F. 2d, pp. 951-2. 
336 See Schachter (1999), pp. 259-60. 
337 If several States claim jurisdiction, Boulesbaa seems to support the following hierarchy of jurisdictions: 1) 
the territorial State, 2) the State of the offender, 3) the State of the victim, and 4) the custodial State, see 
Boulesbaa (1999), p. 203. The suggested hierarchy was suggested by the International Association of Penal 
Law in the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, UN Doc. E/CN.4/NGO.213 
(1987). The draft was never adopted, but under the principle of reasonableness, the hierarchical structure 
would probably be resembled in State practice. 
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 conclusion that customary law does not provide such a rule, at least not in regard to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over international crimes. 
 Boulesbaa further argues that the exercise of jurisdiction is conditioned by the 
principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.338 He suggests that the 
requirements of the principle of non-intervention implies that the territorial State under any 
circumstances has a primary right to prosecute. If this State requests jurisdiction, the 
custodial State would be under an absolute obligation to extradite. Only if the territorial 
State did not require extradition could the custodial State submit the case to its competent 
authorities without violating the principle of non-intervention.339  
 Boulesbaa finds support for his argumentation in the preparatory work of the 
Convention, where the drafters expressed an intention not to offend the principle of non-
intervention. The weight of this argument may be disputed, since the preparatory work of 
the Convention is only relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation. Only if the 
interpretation based on the adopted text and the purpose of the provision is ambiguous or 
unreasonable, should arguments from the process of drafting be referred to in support of a 
different meaning.340  
 Given the lack of ambiguity in the textual interpretation of article 7, the final 
alternative is that the result based on the text is unreasonable. This alternative does not 
seem appropriate. If the territorial State itself is considered to be unable or unwilling to 
conduct a fair trial, it does not appear unreasonable to let a custodial State Party investigate 
and prosecute the alleged offender of torture; especially when the territorial State itself has 
accepted the formulation in the adopted text. If the territorial State is a Non-Party State, the 
customary status of the principle of non-interference in regard to the prosecution of torture 
must be examined.341
 Guillaume, like Bassiouni, is of the opinion that extradition must have primacy to 
prosecution. In his Arrest Warrant-opinion, Guillaume writes that “subsidiary universal 
jurisdiction [is] provided for by various conventions”.342 He does not, however, explain 
what he means by using this terminology. 
 Bassiouni and Wiese argue that there is no supremacy for one alternative over the 
other when the obligation to extradite or prosecute is applied. In the introduction to their 
                                                 
338 Boulesbaa (1999), p. 179 and p. 235. 
339 Boulesbaa (1999), p. 233. 
340 See article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
341 See the discussion in chapter 4, subsections 4.3.2 and 4.3.7. 
342 See the Separate opinion of President Guillaume, §§ 7, 12 and 16. 
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 book “Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International law”, 
Bassiouni and Wiese put forward the view that: 
“…the order in which these words appear should not betaken to signify that 
any particular priority is supposed to attach to extradition (as opposed to 
prosecution)…”343
Instead of arguing that one of the alternatives in general is primary to the other, they infer 
that there may be circumstances under which one of them should be preferred.344 A similar 
approach is taken by Ingelse.345
5.2.3.3 State practice 
As elaborated on in section 4.3.6.1, State practice is limited with respect to exercise of 
conditioned universal jurisdiction on the basis of CAT. This may be perceived as evidence 
that extradition is perceived as primary to prosecution in the custodial State. On the other 
hand, the practice may also be a result of convenience, ‘political politeness’ and other 
considerations. Accordingly it does not provide solid support for any one interpretation. 
 The question of whether the right to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of CAT 
article 7 is subsidiary to the jurisdiction of the territorial State, is one of the issues debated 
in the Case Concerning Certain Criminal proceedings in France.346 France is here of the 
opinion that their jurisdiction is not subsidiary, while the Congo is of the opposite opinion. 
Although it is necessary to exercise caution in drawing analogies between practices 
related to different conventions, the Lockerbie-case illustrates how a similar jurisdictional 
conflict, arising under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, was solved. The case regarded the right of Libya to deny 
extradition of two Libyans. The men were accused of hijacking and bombing an American 
airplane over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The States involved, Libya, the UK and the 
United States, were all Parties to the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, a convention with articles similar to 
CAT article 5 and 7. The UK and the US claimed extradition on the basis of the Montreal 
Convention, but the claim was initially rejected by Libya on the grounds that Libya both 
had jurisdiction over the act and wanted to exercise jurisdiction. 
                                                 
343 See Bassiouni and Wise (1995), p. xii. 
344 Ibid. 
345 See Ingelse (2001), p. 326. 
346 See note 21 with accompanying text. 
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  When Libya denied extradition, the US and the UK, joined by France, presented the 
case to the UN Security Council and General Assembly in 1991.347 The result was three 
UN resolutions; the first urging Libya to comply with the extradition request,348 the second 
imposing economic sanctions on Libya349 and the third extending the sanctions.350  
Libya responded by bringing the case before the ICJ. It requested provisional 
measures to prevent the US and the UK from taking any action to coerce Libya into 
handling over the two suspects. Libya did not succeed. The court denied such measures by 
vote of 11 to 5, thereby affirming the validity of the UN Resolutions.351  
 In 1998, the Security Council passed a new resolution in which it fully endorsed a 
plan proposed by the UK and the US. According to this plan, prosecution of the two 
Libyans was to be conducted in the Netherlands by a Scottish Court. The accused were 
transferred to the Netherlands on 5 April 1999 in order to stand trial.352 10 September 2003 
the ICJ removed the case from the Court’s List at the joint request of the Parties.353
 The Lockerbie case is interesting as it shows that the UN had to be involved in 
order to compel a State to extradite, or rather transfer to a third State, an alleged offender. 
It was not claimed that Libya had a primary duty to extradite the alleged offenders to the 
territorial State or otherwise was unable to fulfil its obligations under the Montreal 
Convention. The political aspect of the case made the territorial States apply extraordinary 
means in order to attain custody of the accused in order to bring them to trial.  
5.2.3.4 Conclusion 
The text and context of article 7 supports the conclusion that the duty to submit for 
prosecution is alternative and not subsidiary to the duty to extradite. The aim of CAT and 
the interests of justice further suggest that the custodial State in each case evaluates the 
possibilities of fair trial, e.g. in the territorial State, before the decision to extradite or 
prosecute is made. The custodial State has discretion to make this evaluation under CAT.  
                                                 
347 UN Doc. A/46/825, S/23306, 31 December 1991. 
348 SC Res. 731 (1992), 21 January 1992. 
349 SC Res. 748 (1992), 31 March 1992. 
350 SC Res. 883 (1993), 11 November 1993. 
351 See the Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Order, Provisional Measures, 14 April 1992, General List No. 88 
and 89. 
352 The case is presented in more detail by Plachta, “The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in 
Enforcing the Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare” (2001), pp. 125-40. 
353 The order and press release are available at http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/ 
presscom2003-29_luklus_20030910.htm (visited 20.04.04). 
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 The Lockerbie case shows that the decision whether to extradite or prosecute crimes with 
extraterritorial elements may involve difficult political considerations. In such cases, the 
Parties have to turn to other international bodies in order to reconcile their disagreements. 
The case supports the conclusion that there is primacy for neither extradition nor 
prosecution when the formula aut dedere aut judicare is applied in treaty law. 
5.2.4 The exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
5.2.4.1 Introduction 
A decision to prosecute primarily depends on the fulfilment of the requirements of 
substantive and procedural law. Furthermore, extra-judicial considerations may influence 
the prosecutorial decision. In the case of ‘ordinary crimes’ the insignificance of the act or 
the disproportional costs of the proceedings may lead to the decision not to prosecute. This 
may be the result although all legal requirements for prosecution are fulfilled.  
 With respect to extraterritorial acts of torture, neither the insignificance of the act 
nor expensive proceedings seem relevant for the decision whether to prosecute or not.354 
The proceedings may turn out to be expensive, but the gravity of the crime would in most 
cases ensure that the costs would be proportionate if sufficient evidence first was made 
available.  
 On the other hand, diplomatic relations between the prosecuting State and the 
territorial State could constitute an important consideration in the eyes of the Government 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the case of torture committed abroad, such political 
considerations could easily impel a State not to prosecute an alleged torturer from another 
State. 
 The political nature of the crime of torture raises the question of whether, or to what 
extent, State Parties are free to take political concerns into consideration when they decide 
the question of prosecution.  
5.2.4.2 The text, context and purpose of article 7 
According to the wording of article 7 paragraph 1, State Parties are under an obligation to 
“submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”. The text is 
not formulated as an absolute duty to prosecute, only as a duty to submit the case to the 
competent authorities. According to article 7 paragraph 2, the decision whether to 
                                                 
354 See Ingelse (2001), p. 329. 
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 prosecute or not shall be taken in “the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence 
of a serious nature under the law of that state". This is the only explicit requirement in 
article 7 of relevance for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
On the basis of article 7 paragraph 1, keeping in mind that the purpose of 
submission is prosecution, it may be argue that prosecution should be the result in every 
case where the legal requirements for prosecution are fulfilled.  
This solution would also have support from the aim and purpose of CAT. As 
stressed in regard to article 5 paragraph 2, the aim of CAT is “to make more effective the 
struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
throughout the world”.355 Since few crimes of torture are prosecuted in the State where 
they are committed, the prosecution of torture in other States is important in order to bring 
the perpetrators to justice. If the prosecution of extraterritorial acts of torture could be 
cancelled due to political considerations, CAT as a whole would loose much of its practical 
significance in the fight against impunity for torture. 
 Conversely, the only way a prosecutorial decision would be contrary to the 
formulation of article 7 is if it is taken in a different manner than in the case of any other 
crime of a serious nature. As long as the procedure is the same as in any other case of a 
similar serious nature, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion appears unrestricted. The 
text in article 5 paragraph 2 is clear in this respect. Hence, albeit the purpose of article 7 is 
to ensure the prosecution of torturers, the text of the same article is formulated in a manner 
that clearly protects the prosecutorial discretion of the State.  
5.2.4.3 Interpretations of publicists 
Boulesbaa is the only scholar in the examined literature that explicitly addresses the 
relevance of political considerations for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In lack of 
explicit support from the preparatory work of CAT, Boulesbaa bases his argumentation on 
the preparatory work of other conventions which have adopted a similar formulation to 
CAT article 7. Boulesbaa argues in the following manner: 
"Paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Torture Convention was borrowed from the 
Hague and Montreal Conventions referred ... The records of the drafting 
history of the Hague Convention indicate that the paragraph was intended to 
prevent the intrusion of political considerations in deciding whether to 
prosecute or not to prosecute those who commit acts of hijacking. By analogy, 
                                                 
355 See CAT’s preamble. 
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 the desired function to be performed ... is to prohibit the competent authorities 
... from taking into account the political aspects of the crime of torture when 
they make a decision."356
Boulesbaa concludes: 
“While the paragraph did not totally close the door on the influence and 
involvement of political considerations … it does not permit the competent 
authorities to make the decision with no regard whatsoever to legal 
grounds.”357
The argument derived from this analysis, namely that the relevance of political 
considerations should be restricted, fits properly with the aim of CAT to contribute to the 
enforcement of individual liability for torture. It is significant, though, that this argument is 
drawn from the preparatory work of other conventions. This method of reasoning is not 
usually applied in international law. The result derived from such a method may lead to a 
result the State Parties have had no opportunity to comment on.  
 When the wording of CAT clearly protects the discretion of State Parties, the result 
based on the textual interpretation should prevail. This interpretation is in accordance with 
the practice of the ICJ, which has emphasised that “the first duty of a tribunal which was 
called upon to interpret a text was to endeavour to give effect to the words used in the 
context in which they occurred, by attributing to them their natural and ordinary 
meaning.”358
Subsidiary means of interpretation should not be used to interpret the treaty in another 
direction when the text is clear; only to support a conclusion that follows from the text.359  
 In this context it is interesting to note that even though the relevance of political 
considerations was not explicitly debated during the drafting of CAT,360 the formulation of 
the duty to prosecute was. In the initial stages of the drafting process, the original Swedish 
proposal included an explicit duty to prosecute: 
“Each State Party shall, except in the cases referred to in article 14, ensure 
that criminal proceedings are instituted in accordance with its national law 
against an alleged offender who is present in its territory, if its competent 
authorities establish an act of torture as defined in article 1 appears to have 
                                                 
356 Boulesbaa (1999), p. 230. 
357 Ibid, p. 232. 
358 See Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission to the United Nations Case, Advisory 
opinion, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 8. 
359 See the Vienna Convention article 32. 
360 See Boulesbaa (1999), p. 230. 
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 been committed and if that State Party has jurisdiction over the offence in 
accordance with article 8.”361  
The choice to alter this formulation signified a reluctance to impose a compulsory 
obligation to prosecute. This part of the drafting process therefore supports an unlimited 
discretion which fits well with the conclusion based on the ordinary meaning of the text. 
5.2.4.4 State practice 
Building on Ingelse’s research, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to 
article 7 paragraph 2 has mainly been addressed in the dialogue between the Netherlands 
and the Torture Committee.362 Of special interest in this regard is the Dutch decision not to 
prosecute Pinochet during his visit to the Netherlands in 1994. The official rationale in the 
Report to the Torture Committee was that a successful prosecution seemed unlikely due to 
difficulties of attaining evidence from Chile.363 While the Dutch delegation invited a 
comment from the Torture Committee “as those issues might be of interest to other 
countries”,364 no such comment came forth.365  
The Torture Committee has expressed that a system of ‘appropriateness of 
prosecution’ is in conflict with CAT article 12, but after the wording of article 12, the 
article concerns the duty of each State Party to ensure prompt investigation of torture 
committed “in any territory under its jurisdiction”.366 The statement seems thus to have 
limited relevance in regard to article 7 paragraph 2, even though the decision to prosecute 
shall be taken in the same manner as any other offence of a serious nature. 
5.2.4.5 Conclusion 
The ordinary meaning of the text, the preparatory work and the limited practice in regard to 
article 7 paragraph 2 provides support for the conclusion that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion is left to be regulated by the States. Arguments drawn from these sources 
suggest that the States have full discretion as long as the decision to prosecute is taken in 
the same manner as any other decision to prosecute serious crimes. The purpose of CAT 
                                                 
361 See Boulesbaa (1999), pp. 208-217; and U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1285 (1978). 
362 See Ingelse (2001), pp. 346-9. 
363 See Summary record of the public part of the 211th meeting, Netherlands, 01 May 1995, CAT/C/SR.211 
(Summary Record), § 27-28. 
364 Ibid., § 29. 
365 See Ingelse (2001), p. 348. 
366 See Ingelse (2001), p. 348, referring to Summary record of the public part of the 323rd meeting: France, 
Norway. 11 May 1998, CAT/C/SR.323 (Summary Record), under D, 2 and E, 4. 
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 and the arguments drawn from the preparatory works of other conventions do not have the 
weight to challenge this conclusion.  
 Of importance for the practical application of article 7 is then the question of 
whether State Parties de facto apply the same procedure when deciding whether to 
prosecute torture committed abroad, and torture, or other serious crimes, committed within 
its own territory.  
 A brief examination of the prosecutorial arrangements in a few States shows that 
the procedures often vary dependent on where the crime of torture has been committed and 
the nationality of the offender. The question whether to prosecute torture committed 
abroad by foreigners is e.g. in Norway taken by the Government,367 in Demark by the 
Minister of Justice,368 and in Sweden the Government has to approve or control the 
prosecutorial decision.369 This is not the normal procedure of deciding prosecutorial 
questions in these three countries. In a case regarding a serious offence committed within 
the State’s own territory, neither the Government nor the Minister of Justice would be 
involved in the prosecutorial process.370  
 The Norwegian and Danish approaches do not fit well with the treaty obligation to 
take the prosecutorial decision in the ordinary manner of other serious crimes. On the basis 
of the text of article 7 it could accordingly be argued that systems similar to the Norwegian 
and Danish ones in practice are contrary to CAT.371
 It is further evident that as long as the political leadership decides the prosecutorial 
question in cases with an international aspect, no external control may restrict the 
relevance of political motives. This may lead to unfortunate decisions that do not serve the 
interest of justice. Practice from States with independent prosecutors also shows that States 
with truly independent prosecutors to a much larger extent are willing to prosecute 
extraterritorial crimes when the territorial State itself is unwilling. 
                                                 
367 See the Norwegian Penal Code, § 13. 
368 See “Rigsadvokatens meddelelse om forelæggelsesregler og kompetanceregler m.v.”, 20 March 2002, 
CIR nr. 9104. 
369 See Brottbalkan, Chapter 2, § 5. 
370 In the UK, the General Attorney has to consent to the prosecution of torture independent of where it has 
been committed and the nationality of the alleged offender, see the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, Part XI, 
sections 134 and 135. 
371 States which seem to fulfil the obligation to take the prosecutorial decision in the same manner as other 
serious crimes are e.g. the UK, see The Criminal Justice Act, 1988, Section 135, and Finland, see Strafflagen, 
§ 12. 
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 6 Concluding remarks and evaluations de lege feranda 
6.1 The right to apply universal jurisdiction over torture 
CAT has adopted the conditioned form of universal jurisdiction. State Parties to CAT have 
accordingly subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the Convention over alleged tortures 
present in their territory which are nationals of other State Parties and not extradited to 
other States. 
As discussed in the thesis, the status of customary law seems disputed in the case of 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. On the basis of the PCIJ’s judgement in the Lotus 
case, it may be argued that there are two possible rules for this type of jurisdiction. 
Under the main rule on extraterritorial jurisdiction, as defined by the PCIJ in the 
Lotus judgement, the presence of the alleged torturer does not appear necessary for the 
lawfulness of universal jurisdiction. As long as universal jurisdiction is enforced within the 
territory of the State, without violating other rules of international law, every State can 
claim universal jurisdiction on the basis of the State’s own sovereignty. Both absolute and 
conditioned universal jurisdiction will be lawful under this approach.  
Under the proposed alternative rule on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, also 
defined by the PCIJ in the Lotus judgement, a State needs authority from a rule of 
international law in order to exercise universal jurisdiction. As the examination above 
illustrates, it is difficult to find evidence that customary law provides such absolute 
universal jurisdiction over torture. There is substantial evidence, however, that universal 
jurisdiction over torture is provided by customary international law when the alleged 
offender is present in the territory. The most authoritative interpretation in support of such 
a rule is based on the jus cogens status of the prohibition against torture. 
The relevance of the presence of the alleged offender under customary law depends 
accordingly on whether extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction must be based on a rule of 
international law or not. It may be argued that the position presented as the ‘main rule’ in 
the Lotus judgment is too liberal and that a more restricted approach should be applied 
today. This position covered by the ‘main rule’ has, however, not been overruled neither 
by the ICJ or any other international tribunals in any operate part of their judgments. This 
is a substantial argument in support of its application until the question is decided 
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 differently by an authoritative source. The case registered by the ICJ as the Case 
Concerning Certain Criminal proceedings in France case may result in a clarification of 
this question. 
6.2 The duty to apply conditioned universal jurisdiction 
Customary law provides a discretional right to apply universal jurisdiction over torture, 
whether it be absolute under the main rule or conditioned under the alternative rule. There 
is no authoritative support for a duty to apply universal jurisdiction under customary law. 
CAT on the other hand, provides a duty for State Parties to submit a case for 
prosecution unless the alleged offender is not extradited. The duty covers in principle all 
alleged torturers present in the territory of a State Party, but in the case of nationals of 
Non-Party States, the State Party should make sure that conditioned universal jurisdiction 
was recognized under customary law also at the time when the crime was committed. 
State Parties have prosecutorial discretion, but the decision whether to prosecute or 
not shall be taken in the same manner as any other serious offence under domestic law. 
This requirement implies that neither the government nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
should have the authority to decide whether to prosecute or not, unless these political 
bodies also have this competence in the case of other serious crimes committed within the 
State’s own territory. As illustrated with practice from Norway, Denmark and Sweden, 
certain States have arranged their prosecutorial competence in a manner unlike the normal 
one in cases regarding torture committed abroad amongst foreigners. 
6.3 Chaos or justice: Evaluations de lege ferenda 
The primary aim of criminal law has by former President Guillaume of the ICJ been 
formulated in the following manner: 
“The primary aim of the criminal law is to enable punishment in each country 
of offences committed in the national territory. That territory is where 
evidence of the offence can most often be gathered. That is where the offence 
generally produces its effects. Finally, that is where the punishment imposed 
can most naturally serve as an example.” 
The observation that the territoriality of criminal law is fundamental and of principal 
standing is important and correct. Still, this does not imply that there are no extra-territorial 
elements in criminal law. The notion of a universal fight against impunity and aspirations 
of universal realization of fundamental human rights are factors which indicate that serious 
crimes are not only the concern of the State where the crime has been committed. As 
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 pointed out by Mary Robinson, when she welcomed the Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction: 
“The principle of universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain 
crimes are so harmful to international interests that States are entitled - and 
even obliged - to bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the 
location of the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. Human 
rights abuses widely considered to be subject to universal jurisdiction include 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture. … The exercise of 
universal jurisdiction holds the promise for greater justice for the victims of 
serious human rights violations around the world.”372
As long as the basic principles of criminal law are respected, such as legality, predictability 
and fair trial, universal jurisdiction may prove important in the fight against impunity for 
torture. If impunity for torture could be eliminated on a universal basis, this would 
constitute a clear message to all torturers as well as their victims. The message would be 
that torture never is accepted and that violations have a consequence, where ever it is 
committed and whoever the offender is. 
When promising aspects of universal jurisdiction are stressed, the problematic sides 
should also be emphasised Even though absolute universal jurisdiction may be lawful 
under current customary law, and furthermore prove useful in certain situations, the 
critique raised against this approach should not be neglected. 
If absolute universal jurisdiction is to be applied, conflicts of jurisdiction are even 
more likely to appear than under the application of conditioned universal jurisdiction. One 
could emphasize in theory the importance of giving priority to the territorial State, if this 
State is willing and able to prosecute. In practice though, the determination of whether the 
territorial State is willing and able appears difficult.  
 The application of absolute universal jurisdiction will also make the enforcement of 
international criminal law quite unpredictable. While conditioned universal jurisdiction is 
limited to the State where an alleged torturer is present of his or her own free, absolute 
universal jurisdiction over torture in theory opens the gate for all States in all cases 
regarding torture. 
The application of absolute universal jurisdiction over torture may thus create more 
inter-State conflicts than actually solve the problem of impunity. In order to put an 
effective end to impunity, active international co-operation in order to codify the rules on 
                                                 
372 The foreword was delivered 23 July 3001 and is available at http://www.princeton.edu 
/~lapa/principles.html (visited 12.04.04). 
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 criminal jurisdiction appears crucial. Only if the States have agreed upon the scope and 
application of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction can they be expected to co-operate in 
order to provide evidence. All States should accordingly be encouraged to sign and ratify 
instruments that address the enforcement of individual liability, and, equally important, 
State Parties should be encouraged to implement and enforce jurisdiction in accordance 
with their international obligations. If necessary, the international community should 
continue to develop international instruments that clearly address the enforcement of 
individual accountability. 
There is a need to strike a balance between the interests of the accused, the victims and 
the international community as a whole. This is a challenging task, but it is crucial for a 
fair and trustworthy administration of justice in a universal context. 
 98 
  
7 References 
7.1 Table of Documents 
7.1.1 International treaties with universal application 
The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S., xvi. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S., p. 171 
and 1057 U.N.T.S., p. 407. 
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
23 September 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. No. 14118, pp. 178-184. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9. 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945. 
The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S., p. 85. 
The Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S., p. 331. 
7.1.2 International treaties with regional application 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
The American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36., O.A.S. Off. 
Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc.21, rev.6, (1970) 9 I.L.M. 673. 
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, 26 November 1987, E.T.S. No. 126, 
amended according to the provisions of Protocols No. 1, ETS No. 151, and No. 2, ETS No. 152. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 
November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S., p. 221, E.T.S. 5. 
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 12 September 1985, O.A.S.T. 67. 
7.1.3 General Assembly resolutions 
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, 14 December 1990, A/RES/45/111; U.N. Doc. 
A/45/49 (1990). 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, A/RES/43/173, annex; U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988). 
 99 
 Optional Protocol to The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 18 December 2002, A/RES/57/200. 
Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in 
the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/RES/37/194, annex; U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982). 
UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/RES/3452 (XXX), annex; U.N. Doc. 
A/10034 (1975). 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 10 December 1948, G. A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc 
A/810, p. 71. 
The 1970 Declaration of the United Nations on the Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the 
United Nations States, 24 October 24 1970, A/RES/2625 (XXV); UN Doc. A/8028 (1971). 
7.1.4 Security Council resolutions 
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such 
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994, 8 November 1994, S/RES/955; 14 August 2002, S/RES/1431. 
The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, 25 May 1993, S/RES/827; 17 May 2002, S/RES/1411. 
Resolutions related to the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, SC Res. 731 (1992), 21 January 
1992; SC Res. 748 (1992), 31 March 1992; SC Res. 883 (1993), 11 November 1993. 
7.1.5 Other UN documents 
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture in regard to Norway, 
CAT/C/ NOR, 06/05/98 and 28/05/2002. 
Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Cambodia on the Khmer 
Rouge trials, 13 May 2003, U.N. Doc. A/57/806. 
Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, The International 
Association of Penal Law, UN Doc. E/CN.4/NGO.213 (1987). 
Draft on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, available at: 
http://www.article2.org/mainfile.php/0106/59/ (visited 05.02.04). 
 100 
 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 30 August 1955, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF/611, annex I; U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957); U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977). 
The first Swedish Draft proposal to CAT, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1285 (1978). 
General Comment No. 13 on ICCPR article 14, 13 April 1984, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1. 
General Comment No. 20 on ICCPR article 7, 10 April 1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 
and A/47/40, annex VI. 
General comment No. 24 on ICCPR article 14, 4 Nov. 1994, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6. 
The International Law Commission’s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of 
the International Law Commission, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/49/10. 
On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, 
Regulation issued by United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, 6 June 2000, 
UNTAET/REG/2000/15. 
Report by the Special Rapporteur on Torture, P. Koojimans, 19 February 1986, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 
4/1986/15. 
Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html (visited 06.04.04). 
Summary of the comments received from Governments on the first Draft Articles of CAT, U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/1314, 1978. 
Summary record of the public part of the 211th meeting, Netherlands, 1 May 1995, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/SR.211 (Summary Record). 
Summary record of the public part of the 323rd meeting: France, Norway, 11 May 1998, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/SR.323 (Summary Record). 
7.1.6 Other documents of interest 
The Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, UN Doc. E/CN.4/NGO.213 
(1987). 
The Robben Island Guidelines to Prohibit Torture in Africa, the 32nd Ordinary Session of  The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Banjul, The Gambia, 17-23 October 
2002, available at http://www.apt.ch/africa/rig/Robben%20Island%20Guidelines.pdf (visited 
11.04.04). 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf (visited 08.04.04). 
Rigsadvokatens meddelelse om forelæggelsesregler og kompetanceregler m.v., 20 March 2002, 
CIR nr. 9104. 
 101 
 7.2 Table of cases 
7.2.1 The Permanent Court of International Justice 
The Case of the Steamship Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment No. 9, P.C.I.J. Series A No. 10, 
1927, available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/cases/lotuslaw.htm (visited 28.11.03). 
7.2.2 The International Court of Justice 
Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959. 
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. 
U.S.A.), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986. 
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Belgium),Judgment, Separate opinion of President Guillaume, Joint separate opinion of Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, and Dissenting opinion of Judge Wan den Wyngaert, 14 
February 2002, General List No. 121. 
Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction; Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 
1962) (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970. 
Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951. 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark) (Federal Republic 
of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969. 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996. 
The South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa) (Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966. 
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission to the United Nations Case, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1950. 
Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Order, Provisional Measures, 14 April 
1992, and Order, Removing Case from the List, 10 September 2003, General List No. 88 and 
89. 
Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), 
Order, Provisional Measures, 17 June 2003, and Order, Time-Limits for Memorial,11 July 
2003, General List No. 129. 
7.2.3 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 10 December 1998, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. 17-95-
17/1-T. 
 102 
 Prosecutor v. Delalic and Others, 16. November 1988, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-
21-T. 
Prosecutor v. Kuranac and Others, 22 February 2001, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-
23-T. 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A “Dule”, 10 August 1995, Trial Chamber, Decision on the 
Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-T. 
7.2.4 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Barrios Altos case, Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 14 March 2001, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/serie_c_75_ing.doc (visited 20.02.04). 
7.2.5 The European Court of Human Rights 
Al Adsani v. U.K., App. No. 35763/97. 
7.2.6 The Nuremberg tribunal and US Military Tribunal 
The Nuremberg trial, Trials of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal: 
Nuremberg 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946. Nuremberg: The Tribunal (1947). 
The Trial of Wilhelm List and others, Case No. 47, United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. VIII, 1949, available at 
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/List1.htm (visited 17.03.04). 
7.2.7 National courts 
7.2.7.1 The United Kingdom 
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, parte Pinochet Ugarte, (No. 
3), 1999, 2 All ER 97, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990324/pino1.htm (visited 08.04.04). 
7.2.7.2 The United States of America 
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Circuit 1992), available at 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/siderman.html (visited 05.04.04). 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Circuit 1980), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/27721c1b47e7ca90c1256d18002a2565?OpenDocument (visited 05.04.04). 
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, (1985) 603 F. Supp. 1468; 776 F. 2d. 571. 
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (DC Cir. 1984). 
 103 
 7.2.7.3 Senegal 
Guengueng et al. v. Habré, Court of Appeals of Dakar (Chambre d’Accusation), 4. July 2000, 
Appeals judgement; Court of Cassation, First Chamber, 20 March 2001, Cassation judgement. 
7.2.7.4 Israel 
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 29 May 1962, English translation 
in 36 International Law Reports p. 298. 
7.3 Bibliography 
The American Law Institute: Restatement of the Law (Third), The Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States. St. Paul, Minn: The American Law Institute (1987). ISBN 0-314-30138-0. 
BBC News: US attacks Belgium war crimes law, 12 June 2003, avilable at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2985744.stm (visited 07.04.04). 
BBC News: US general 'war crimes' case filed, 14 May 2003, avilable at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3026371.stm (visited 07.04.04). 
British Broadcasting News: Belgium amends war crimes law, 1 August 2003, avilable at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3116975.stm (visited 07.04.04). 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif: International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, in Reigning in 
impunity for international crimes and serious violations of fundamental human rights: 
Proceedings of the Siracusa Conference, 17-21 September 1998, Christoph C. Joyner and M. 
Cherif Bassiouni (eds.). Tolouse: Érès, Association Internationale de Droit Pénale (1998), pp. 
133-48. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif: Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice, in 42 Virginia Journal of International Law (2001-2002), pp. 82-162. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif and Edward M. Wise: Aut dedere aut judicare. The duty to Extradite or 
Prosecute in International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1995). ISBN 0-7923-
3349-7. 
Boed, Roman: The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute 
Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations, in 33 Cornell International Law 
Journal (2000), pp. 297-329. 
Boulesbaa, Ahcene: The UN Convention against Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers / Kluwer Law International (1999). ISBN 90-411-0457-7. 
Brody, Reed: The Case of Augusto Pinochet, in The Pinochet Papers. The Case of Augusto 
Pinochet in Spain and Britain, Reed Brody and Michael Ratner (eds.), pp. 7-22. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International (2000). ISBN 90-411-1404-1. 
Broomhall, Bruce: International Justice & the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty 
and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003). ISBN 0-19-925600-4. 
 104 
 Brownlie, Ian: Principles of public international law, 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2003). ISBN 0-19-926071-0. 
Burgers, J. Herman and Hans Danelius: The United Nations Convention against Torture. A 
Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers / Kluwer Law International 
(1988). ISBN 90-247-3609-9. 
Bröhmer, Jürgen: State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers / Kluwer Law International (1997). ISBN 90-411-0322-8. 
Cassese, Antonio: When may Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on The Congo v. Belgium Case, in 13 European Journal of International Law 
(2002), pp. 853-76. 
Cassese, Antonio: International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003). ISBN 0-
19-925911-9. 
Encyclopædia Britannica: International law, in Encyclopædia Britannica Online, available at 
http://search.eb.com/ebi/article?eu=297015 (visited 02.02.04). 
Encyclopædia Britannica: Philosophy of law, in Encyclopædia Britannica Online, available at 
http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=115100 (visited 05.04.04). 
Encyclopædia Britannica: Signoria, in Encyclopædia Britannica Online, available at 
http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=69476 (visited 02.02.04). 
Falk, Richard A.: The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order. New York: 
Syracuse University Press (1964). Library of Congress catalog card: 64-16924. 
Ford, Christopher A.: Adjudicating jus cogens, in 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal (1994), 
pp. 145-81. 
Forrest, Duncan: “Moderate Physical Pressure” in Israel, February 2000, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/action/nw/hpn/newslet/israel2.shtml (visited 17.03.04). 
Fox, Hazel: The law of state immunity. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002). ISBN 0-19-
829836-6. 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S.: Crime in International Law: Obligations Erga Omnes and the Duty to 
Prosecute, in The Reality of International Law: Essays in Hounor of Ian Brownlie (1999), Guy 
S. Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon (eds.), pp. 207-8. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1999). ISBN 0-
19-826837-8. 
The Guardian: Detainee tells of Guantanamo ‘torture’, 12 March 2004, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uklatest/story/0,1271,-3851811,00.html (visited 25.03.04). 
The Guardian: US embassy rebuts Guantánamo torture claims, 18 March 2004, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,13743,1172585,00.html (visited 25.03.04). 
Hall, Christopher Keith: Contemporary universal jurisdiction, in Human Rights and Criminal 
Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Hounor of Asbjørn Eide, Morten Bergsmo (ed.), pp. 
 105 
 111-37. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher / Bill Academic Publisher (2003). ISBN 90-0413-
676-2. 
Hannikainen, Lauri: Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law. Historical 
Development, Criteria, Present Status. Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company (1988). 
ISBN 951-640-394-8. 
Higgins, Rosalyn: Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1994). ISBN 0-19-825767-8. 
Human Rights Watch: Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, 1 August 2003, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/08/belgium080103.htm (visited 22.03.04). 
Ingelse, Chris: The UN Committee against Torture. An assessment. The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International (2001). ISBN 90-411-1650-8. 
Kissinger, Henry A.: The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, in Foreign Affairs (July/August 2001). 
Malanczuk, Peter: Akehurst's modern introduction to international law, 7th ed. London: Routledge 
(1997). ISBN 0-415-11120-X. 
Malekian, Farhad: International Criminal Law. The Legal and Critical Analysis of International 
Crime, Vol. 1. Uppsala: Farhad Malekian / Borgströms Tryckeri AB (1991). ISBN 91-630-
0244-2. 
Peters, Edward: Torture, Expanded ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press (1996). 
ISBN 0-8122-1599-0. 
Plachta, Michael: The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the Principle 
Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, in 21 The European Journal of Human Rights (2001) No. 1, pp. 125-
40. 
Ragazzi, Maurizion: The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2000). ISBN 0-19-826480-1. 
Randall, Kenneth C.: Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, in 1966 Texas Law Review 
(1987-1988), pp. 785-841. 
Ratner, Steven R. and Jason S. Abrams: Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law. Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press 
Inc (2001). ISBN 0-19-829871-4. 
Reydams, Luc: Universal jurisdiction. International and Municipal Legal Perspectives. New York: 
Oxford University Press Inc (2003). ISBN 0-19-925162-2. 
Rodley, Nigel S.: The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc (1999). ISBN 0-19-826564-6. 
Ruud, Tonje Rønneberg: The Pinochet case and customary international law: Immunity for former 
heads of State. Oslo: Institutt for offentlig rett, Universitetet i Oslo, Unipub (2002). ISBN 82-
8063-015-5. 
 106 
 Schacter, Oscar: International law in theory and practice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
/ Kluwer Academic Publisher (1991). ISBN 0-7923-1024-1. 
Scott, Craig (ed.): Torture as Tort. Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation. Oxford: Hart Publishing (2001). ISBN 1-84113-060-5. 
Seiderman, Ian D.: Hierarchy in International law. The Human Right Dimension. Antwerpen: 
Intersentia (2001). ISBN 90-5095-165-1. 
Sharf, Michael P.: The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party State, in The United 
States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and International law, Sarah 
Sewall and Carl Kaysen (eds.), pp. 213-236. Lenham: Rowman & Littlefield (2000). ISBN 0-
7425-0134-5. 
Shaw, Malcolm N.: International law, 5th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003). 
ISBN 0-521-53183-7. 
Spierman, Ole: Moderne folkerett - etter det 20. arhundre. København: Jurist- og 
økonomiforbundets Forlag (1999). ISBN 87-574-0040-2. 
Sztucki, Jerzy: Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Critical 
Appraisal. Wien: Springer-Verlag (1974). ISBN 3-211-81247-4. 
Watts, Arthur (ed.): International Law Commission 1949-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(1999). ISBN 0-198-29803-X. 
 
 107 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
